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This Article explores the relationship between one typical form of 
real estate development finance—the securitized mezzanine loan—
and one controversial phenomenon—suburban sprawl.  It asks 
foundational questions about the connection between financial 
transactions and real-world applications of the capital they raise.  In 
this work, sprawl serves as an example of an environmental 
consequence of applications of capital raised with a common form of 
transaction.  This Article considers the extent to which commercial 
finance laws release forceful incentives driven by capital markets 
upon land use decisions, potentially undermining the collective, 
morally informed determination such decisions require.  It rejects the 
aesthetic aversion to looking beyond transactional structures in the 
abstract to consider what results as commercial actors use typical 
deals to fund typical growth patterns.  To the extent that standardized 
forms of financial transactions fund recurring land uses that many 
find problematic, the terms and structures of the transactions 
themselves should be a subject of critical inquiry. 
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INTRODUCTION 
ntense debates surround the environmental and cultural desirability 
of the sprawling suburbia that characterizes so much American 
landscape.1  This Article explores the extent to which this landscape 
is a function of dominant patterns and path dependencies in finance. 
“Suburban studies” is an evolved, multidisciplinary project that 
engages suburbia as everything from an economic phenomenon to an 
architecture, a politics, or a mode of cultural production, to name a 
few.2  While others have observed that suburbanization and debt 
finance are intertwined, this Article takes the step of directly relating 
contemporary financing practices to land-use results on the ground. 
Many environmentalists object to new low-density developments, 
especially when the developments consume previously undeveloped 
land.  Yet, deep mystery surrounds the coexistence of our love of 
nature and our indifference to its destruction.3  Home buyers may 
have a range of values and objectives that include commitments to 
open space yet purchase a new home in a sprawling area in response 
to other pressures.  Purchasing a new home is not simply an 
expression of preference for the house over other values.  The age-old 
philosophical problem that we simultaneously love and destroy the 
natural environment refracts the preferences even of a consumer 
committed to an evolved environmental ethic. 
Ultimately, this Article considers the extent to which commercial 
finance laws release the forces of individual profit motive and capital-
market-driven incentives upon collective decisions about growth and 
development that require delicate, morally informed determination.  
 
1 See infra text accompanying notes 86–91, 97–100. 
2 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Save the Cities, Stop the Suburbs?, 116 YALE L.J. 598 
(2006) (reviewing ROBERT BRUEGMANN, SPRAWL: A COMPACT HISTORY (2005); JOEL 
KOTKIN, THE CITY: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2005)); Andrew Reynolds, Disneyfied Sprawl, 
Blue-Collar Bogeymen, and Bourgeois Jeremiads: The Legacy of Investment in Suburbia, 
56 AM. Q. 1067 (2004) (reviewing DOLORES HAYDEN, BUILDING SUBURBIA: GREEN 
FIELDS AND URBAN GROWTH, 1820–2000 (2003); CATHERINE JURCA, WHITE DIASPORA: 
THE SUBURB AND THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICAN NOVEL (2001); SETH M. LOW, 
BEHIND THE GATES: LIFE, SECURITY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN FORTRESS 
AMERICA (2003)). 
3 See generally SHIERRY WEBER NICHOLSEN, THE LOVE OF NATURE AND THE END OF 
THE WORLD: THE UNSPOKEN DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN (2002) 
(exploring the dimensions of experience with nature that remain unspoken, in an effort to 
understand how appreciation of the beauty of nature and indifference to its ruin can 
coexist). 
I
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For example, while environmental policies attempt to control rapid 
consumption of open-space land,4 commercial finance laws facilitate 
real estate developers’ capacity to build as many new developments 
as fast as the market will bear.5  Zoning and other local government 
measures designed to promote “smart growth,” along with 
environmental regulation and property devices like the conservation 
easement, have attempted to slow the disappearance of open space.6  
 
4 Though definitions of “open-space land” can vary, the concept of open space centers 
around natural resources that perform essential ecological functions and provide benefits 
to people.  The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) offers the following definition: 
“Open space includes natural areas such as forests and grasslands, as well as working 
farms, ranches, and timberlands.  Open space also includes parks, stream and river 
corridors, and other natural areas within urban and suburban areas.  Open space lands may 
be protected or unprotected, public or private.”  FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
Loss of Open Space, OPEN SPACE CONSERVATION, http://www.fs.fed.us/openspace 
/loss_space.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).  Other jurisdictions may define “open-space” 
slightly differently.  For example, the State of Virginia defines “open-space land” as 
any land which is provided or preserved for (i) park or recreational purposes, (ii) 
conservation of land or other natural resources, (iii) historic or scenic purposes, 
(iv) assisting in the shaping of the character, direction, and timing of community 
development, (v) wetlands as defined in §28.2-1300, or (vi) agricultural and 
forestal production. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1700 (West 2011). 
5 The recent slow-down in U.S. housing markets does not change the long-term 
population and development projections that threaten open-space land.  The USDA 
currently reports that “[o]pen space is being lost at an alarming rate—almost 6,000 acres 
of open space are converted to developed uses every day.”  FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF 
AGRIC., supra note 4.  Though not all open-space land is forested, forests comprise a 
substantial amount of open space.  A recent report by the U.S. Forest Service states that 
fifty-six percent of the nation’s forests are privately owned, amounting to 420 million 
acres; of that number, fifty-seven million acres face a serious threat from housing 
development in the next twenty years.  See SUSAN M. STEIN ET AL., FOREST SERV., U.S. 
DEP’T OF AGRIC., GEN. TECHNICAL REP. PNW-GTR-795, PRIVATE FORESTS, PUBLIC 
BENEFITS: INCREASED HOUSING DENSITY AND OTHER PRESSURES ON PRIVATE FOREST 
CONTRIBUTIONS 3, 13 (2009), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/openspace/fote/benefits. 
html.  An August 2010 USDA press release states, 
Private forests that play a critical role in supplying our nation with clean water 
resources, and the timber we need to build homes and communities across the 
country will be threatened.  A number of species including the already-
endangered Florida panther and the grizzly bear are also expected to be put at 
risk because of loss of forested land. 
Press Release, Forest Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Release No. 0401.10, Vilsack Highlights 
Report Showing Threats to Private Forested Lands (Aug. 11, 2010) (on file with author). 
6 See generally Patricia E. Salkin, Squaring the Circle on Sprawl: What More Can We 
Do? Progress Toward Sustainable Land Use in the States, 16 WIDENER L.J. 787 (2007) 
(discussing the recent state and local strategies for encouraging growth patterns that do not 
aggravate sprawl and its environmental problems).  For a discussion of current responses 
to persistent problems in land use regulation, see Nicole Stelle Garnett, Unbundling 
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Yet, these efforts swim against a current of capital that responds to 
commercial finance law. 
The increase in practices like mortgage securitization in recent 
decades has coincided with an increase in average home size and in 
the number and uniformity of suburban developments.7  That there is 
a relationship between financing practices that facilitate home 
building and buying, on the one hand, and the issue of suburban 
sprawl, on the other, seems obvious.8  But defining this relationship is 
remarkably difficult.  This Article takes up the challenge. 
Sprawl implicates many questions, including the desirability of 
open-space consumption.  The purpose of this inquiry is not to argue 
that suburban sprawl is a problem.  Rather, it is to present a 
phenomenon that incites intense debate and raises persistent questions 
about our relationship to the natural environment, and then to relate 
that phenomenon to commercial finance rules that govern the 
transactions that fund it. 
What is a private-law problem, and what is not?  Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) Article 99 facilitates secured debt finance 
without regard to whether such finance alleviates or aggravates 
environmental concerns.  Does secured-transactions law itself escalate 
 
Homeownership: Regional Reforms from the Inside Out, 119 YALE L.J. 1904 (2010) 
(reviewing LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND 
PROPERTY LINES (2009)). 
7 See ANDRÉS DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF SPRAWL AND THE 
DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 41 (2000) (stating that “[d]ollar for dollar, no other 
society approaches the United States in terms of the number of square feet per person, the 
number of baths per bedroom, the number of appliances in the kitchen, [and] the quality of 
the climate control”); DOLORES HAYDEN, A FIELD GUIDE TO SPRAWL 110 (2004). 
8 See, e.g., Eduardo Penalver, This Could Mean the End of the Exurbs, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 7, 2008, at A13 (stating that the financial crisis may halt continuing 
suburbanization of ex-urban areas).  For a discussion of “sprawl,” see infra Part II.A. 
9 U.C.C. § 9 (2005).  For a discussion of the scope of Article 9 and the wide range of 
transactions it governs, including its relationship to securitization and to real estate 
finance, see infra Part I.B.  UCC Article 9 governs transactions in which a creditor makes 
a loan and takes as collateral a lien on personal property of the debtor.  Id. § 9-109.  A lien 
is a type of property interest.  Security interests are liens created by contract—consensual 
liens.  The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), in 
conjunction with the American Law Institute (ALI), convenes committees to draft the 
UCC.  See 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS xv (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 
1984).  All U.S. states have enacted UCC Article 9.  UCC Article 9 Amendments (2010), 
UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=UCC%20 
Article%209 %20Amendments%20(2010) (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).  Unless otherwise 
indicated, citations herein to the UCC are to the official text and comments of the ALI and 
NCCUSL. 
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certain forms of commercial activity that can aggravate environmental 
harms?  If so, should the commercial code enact rules with a view 
toward the effects of the transactions it governs?  Does it already do 
this, or does it (and should it) not? 
Part I explores the logic of these foundational questions.  Part II 
then presents a specific context in which one particular form of 
secured transaction—the securitized mezzanine loan10—funds 
developments that contribute to one controversial environmental 
outcome: sprawl.11 
Numerous scholars are looking critically at contemporary forms of 
financial transactions to better understand their distributive 
implications, capacity for wealth maximization, or tendencies to 
create moral hazard.12  The purpose of this work is not to join the 
chorus of critics who call for regulation of financial transactions in 
light of recent market failures.  Rather, it is to ask foundational 
questions about the relationship between the structure of certain types 
of financial transactions and the real-world applications of the capital 
they raise.  In particular, the focus here is on environmental 
consequences of real-world applications of capital raised by 
securitized debt finance.13  Suburban sprawl is an example of an 
environmental consequence of applications of capital raised with this 
type of financing. 
Demonstrating a relationship between financing practices and 
environmental results raises core questions about the scope and 
 
10 Securitized mezzanine lending has slowed down recently, but facilities and templates 
remain in place and the practice will continue.  In fact, some commentators identify this 
transaction as a way to continue to maximize leverage in real estate development financing 
despite mortgage lenders’ return to stricter loan-to-value requirements.  See infra notes 
107–12 and accompanying text.  For a description of this transaction, see infra Part II.B. 
11 Scholars focused on land use policy have discussed sprawl from a variety of vantage 
points.  The word “sprawl” is pejorative and its meaning is complex, but scholars have 
developed several working definitions that capture the kinds of car-dependent, high-
carbon-footprint developments that threaten natural resources throughout the United 
States.  See infra Part II.A. 
12 See, e.g., TODD J. ZYWICKI, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND POLICY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (forthcoming 2011); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind 
Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 (2007); 
Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1759 (2004); 
Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
Securitization Post-Enron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539 (2004). 
13 “Securitized debt finance” refers to loans funded by the proceeds of issuances of 
securities that are collateralized with the same or similar loans. 
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structure of the private-law rules that comprise commercial finance 
law.  These rules—primarily property and contract doctrines codified 
in the UCC and related statutes—create the commercial finance law 
system that provides the basis for practices like securitization. 
The objective of this discussion is not to assign liability for 
environmental harm to secured lenders.  It is to relate environmental 
consequences to the financing practices that shape commercial 
activity.  Specifically, it is to relate securitized structured finance in 
real estate development to the phenomenon of suburban sprawl and its 
environmental impact. 
The houses offered to consumers (who may acquire them with 
mortgage products) do not sprout from the ground.  Developers build 
them with proceeds of secured loans that are very often funded by 
securitization facilities.  This financing structure can be highly 
advantageous for builders, buyers, and financers alike when it lowers 
costs of capital for development that provides new housing that meets 
buyers’ needs.  However, this approach to finance can just as readily 
be problematic.  For example, securitized financing can fund the 
building of more homes at a faster pace than communities desire and 
the environment can withstand.14 
The modes of finance that fund developers’ projects facilitate 
developers’ potential to build at rates that can outpace collective 
decisions regarding open-space preservation.  Current modes of real 
estate finance permit developers to transfer much of the risk of loss 
surrounding new developments to financers.15  There is nothing 
inherently wrong with risk transfer; it is a concept at the root of 
financial transactions.  Risk transfer becomes problematic when it 
creates moral hazards that result not just in transferring risk to a 
 
14 Open-space land is a collective asset with important ecological functions.  Some 
states have begun to quantify the ecological contributions of open spaces by assessing 
“ecosystem services.”  Ecosystem services are the services that natural systems, or 
undeveloped areas, contribute to the public welfare.  Studies quantify the value of these 
services by calculating the replacement cost to the state of services like water filtration or 
carbon dioxide absorption that areas like estuaries or forests currently perform.  See James 
Salzman, Creating Markets for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 870, 897–99 (2005).  Some states have commissioned reports to assess ecosystem 
services provided by the various natural resources in the state.  See, e.g., ROBERT 
CONSTANZA ET AL., GUND INST. FOR ECOLOGICAL ECON., THE VALUE OF NEW JERSEY’S 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES AND NATURAL CAPITAL (2006). 
15 See infra Part II.B. 
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financer for a price but also in costs to communities and the 
environment.16 
When developers use certain common modes of secured debt 
financing to undertake new projects, they can transfer risk of the 
projects’ failure to financers and, ultimately, capital markets.  This 
Article explores the implications of this reality for communities that 
want to control suburban sprawl.17 
Others have made the connection between secured transactions and 
environmental consequences of the activities they fund.  Many have 
recognized that: (1) environmental harm often results from the 
activities of project company subsidiaries—the assets of which are 
assigned to a secured lender, and the liabilities of which are separate 
from those of its corporate parent;18 and (2) secured lenders exercise 
substantial control over debtors through loan covenants and 
monitoring.19 
 
16 The relationship between transfer of risk and externalization of risk is complex.  
Parties transfer risk when assets are sold along with attendant risks; in theory the price will 
reflect the various risks associated with the assets.  Risks are externalized when they are 
not priced into transactions, as when private parties create risks that are imposed on the 
public.  Recent crashes and developments in the financial and housing markets have 
generated much public discourse on the subject of externalities of transactions like 
subprime mortgages and securitization.  This discourse has engaged both risk transfer and 
its capacity to create moral hazard, and risk externalization—socialization of loss—that 
recent market practices have caused.  Many contend that risk transfer through 
securitization leads to externalization of risk, and, ultimately, of loss, when the transferred 
assets fail.  See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 12 (discussing effects of securitization 
on borrowers and on predatory lending practices); LoPucki, supra note 12 (arguing that 
secured lending and securitization enable externalization of costs onto certain classes of 
unsecured creditors). 
17 Some argue that new homes trending upward in size and outward across our 
countryside reflect consumer preferences.  But the notion that consumer demand for 
housing as a commodity should drive land-use policy is problematic.  Consumer 
preferences are complex.  If a larger polity determines that open-space preservation is 
important, then the individual preferences of some consumers may not justify land use 
policies that produce irreversible consumption of open space. 
18 See infra Part I.A. 
19 Given these realities, scholars and lawmakers have argued for secured lender liability 
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA) and for priority in advance of secured lenders for environmental claims.  
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (1986).  Secured lenders themselves have acknowledged their 
role; many project financers have adopted the Equator Principles.  The Equator Principles 
are standards for secured lending that include a commitment to fund only projects that 
meet certain environmental criteria.  EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS’N, THE EQUATOR 
PRINCIPLES: A FINANCIAL INDUSTRY BENCHMARK FOR DETERMINING, ASSESSING AND 
MANAGING SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL RISK IN PROJECT FINANCING (2006), available 
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Part I moves beyond existing approaches to secured transactions 
and environmental impact to challenge the notion that the role of 
commercial finance law is to facilitate commercial transactions 
without regard for the transactions’ environmental effects.20 
After Part I discusses the connection between debt finance and 
environmental impact generally, Part II.A describes sprawl and the 
controversy surrounding environmental consequences of sprawling 
development.  Part II puts the questions presented in Part I.B at play 
in the context of securitized mezzanine financing for developments 
that contribute to suburban sprawl.  It seeks to demonstrate a 
relationship between contemporary commercial finance practices and 
land-use results that many find problematic.  “Mezzanine financing” 
in this context refers to a secured transaction in which the lender takes 
a first-priority security interest in the membership interests of an 
entity (usually a limited liability company (LLC) that holds real estate 
for the purpose of development).21  A mortgage lender typically holds 
 
at http://www.equator-principles.com/resources/equator_principles.  Other major 
institutional lenders have adopted the Carbon Principles—commitments to enhanced 
diligence in financings of fossil fuel generation projects.  See, e.g., Press Release, Bank of 
Am., Bank of America to Announce Adoption of the Carbon Principles at Natural 
Resources Defense Council’s Tenth Annual Award Event (Apr. 1, 2008) (on file with 
author).  A secured lender generally is not liable under CERCLA unless the lender controls 
activities on the site to such an extent that it is effectively the owner–operator of the 
business on the site.  See infra Part I.A. 
20 A few scholars have argued that the very structure of UCC Article 9 encourages 
production without regard to ecology, and is therefore incompatible with environmental 
objectives.  We can understand these arguments as secured-transactions-law-specific 
versions of arguments about environmental harm as a form of market failure more 
generally.  See, e.g., Richard L. Barnes, The U.C.C.’s Insidious Preference for Agronomy 
over Ecology in Farm Lending Decisions, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 457 (1993) (arguing that 
the unitary security interest and purchase money security interest (PMSI) have aggravated 
environmental destruction of American farmland); see also Heather Hughes, Aesthetics of 
Commercial Law—Domestic and International Implications, 67 LA. L. REV. 689, 716–23 
(2007) (discussing a grid aesthetic in commercial law that puts consideration of 
environmental effects of commercial activity out of the purview of the UCC ex ante); 
Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 NW.  U. L. REV. 675, 676–77 (2003) 
(arguing that devices like carbon trading programs have failed to inspire deliberation over 
environmental goals because traditional cost-benefit analyses fail to account for absolute 
limits on environmental capacity); infra notes 72–85 and accompanying text. 
21 Note that the term “mezzanine finance” can describe other types of financings (such 
as unrated debt or convertible loans) in other industries.  The consistent feature in all 
mezzanine financings is that they all involve debt that is senior to equity but functionally 
junior to some other debt.  See Andrew R. Berman, Risks and Realities of Mezzanine 
Loans, 72 MO. L. REV. 993, 998 (2007).  In the case of real estate mezzanine financing, 
the mezzanine lender’s interest is a first-priority or senior interest in the mezzanine loan 
collateral, which is distinct in type from the mortgagee’s or “senior” lender’s collateral.  
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a first-priority lien on the real estate itself.  The mezzanine lender 
holds a first-priority lien on the equity of a special-purpose company 
that holds the realty. 
Mezzanine financing enables real estate developers to leverage 
their projects to a greater degree than is possible with mortgage 
financing.  Leverage can have the effect of isolating developers from 
risk; developers can secure external financing for a project to 
maximize their gain if the project succeeds but to protect them from 
loss if it fails.  Mezzanine lenders, in turn, can shift the risks 
associated with their mezzanine loan portfolios to investors by 
securitizing them.22 
Mezzanine loans are one prominent form of real estate finance.  
The task here is to consider how we might link a given secured 
transaction to the environmental consequences of the activities it 
funds.  Part II re-presents the questions explored in Part I in 
transaction-specific terms.  For example, how can we say that 
mezzanine finance itself escalates certain types of development?  And 
why focus on mezzanine finance as opposed to monetary policy or 
factors altogether apart from finance? 
We could say that controversial environmental consequences of 
suburban sprawl are a function of mezzanine lending because 
securitized mezzanine lending enables real estate development to 
outpace the collective processes by which communities should make 
decisions about growth.  Communities struggle with conflicting goals, 
such as the desire to have open space versus the desire to develop new 
 
The position of the mezzanine lender is distinct from that of a junior mortgage or second 
lien.  Id. 
22 Mezzanine loans are certainly not the only transactions developers can use to raise 
capital.  See infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text.  They may use, for example, 
preferred equity financing or junior mortgages.  UCC Article 9 treats the membership 
interests of an LLC assigned to secure a mezzanine loan like any other LLC membership 
interests.  (They are general intangibles, unless the members, in the LLC operating 
agreement, designate their interests “investment property” within the meaning of Article 8 
of the UCC.)  U.C.C. §§ 8-103(c), 9-102(a)(42) (2005).  Yet, LLCs that hold open-space 
land for development are, in an important sense, not like every other LLC.  On the one 
hand, LLCs engage in countless business activities, all with environmental impact of one 
type or another.  The LLC entity is just a tool that can be used for any kind of project.  An 
instrumentalist aesthetic in commercial law informs this view.  See Hughes, supra note 20, 
at 723–29.  On the other hand, special-purpose LLCs formed for development of open 
space represent a use of this tool that we can link to controversial uses of land.  Examining 
one typical form of real estate development finance could potentially enable reform of 
private actors’ capacities to do environmental harm in the first place. 
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neighborhoods to support the tax base and to attract new residents.  
These conflicting goals are not just tensions to resolve using cost-
benefit concepts; they implicate deeper challenges surrounding the 
coexistence of attachment to nature and tolerance of destruction.  For 
example, while communities, institutions, and individuals grapple 
with the value and meaning of open space, transactional structures 
designed to maximize access to capital for certain modes of building 
serve up the land for rapid consumption.23 
The rules of commercial finance contemplate effects of 
transactions when presented as fairness or efficiency effects.24  It is 
certainly possible to discuss controversial environmental effects of 
suburban sprawl in terms of efficiency25 or in terms of fairness.26  But 
 
23 This Article is an example of what we might call “private environmental law”—
scholarship that finds private ordering central to the concerns of environmental law.  Cf. J. 
Kevin Healy et al., Environmental Review and Climate Change Adaptation, in THE LAW 
OF GREEN BUILDINGS: REGULATORY AND LEGAL ISSUES IN DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION, 
OPERATIONS, AND FINANCING 313, 330 (J. Cullen Howe & Michael B. Gerrard eds., 
2010) (arguing for “real estate development to adapt to the new realities of the world with 
a changing climate”); Margaret Blair et al., The Roles of Standardization, Certification and 
Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 4 COMP. RES. IN L. & POL. ECON., No. 3, 2008 
at 1, 19, 34 (reflecting on the recent proliferation of social and environmental 
responsibility standards for global corporations and encouraging the use of “third-party 
assurance” which is a “market-based solution based on private ordering” to enforce 
environmental standards in global commerce); Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, 
Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 803 (2005) (endorsing a modular 
conception of environmental regulation that “expands the universe of players that might be 
enlisted in decision making about resource conflict” to include private actors and 
stakeholders; Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification Programs and 
Environmental Law: Closer Than You May Think, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10162, 10163, 
10173 (2001) (advancing environmental certification programs, which “seek to verify for a 
broader public that the activities of certified [private] enterprises are environmentally 
appropriate,” arguing that such programs “are likely to become important engines of 
change in American environmental law,” and specifically naming property law as an area 
of law in which such programs will have an impact); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New 
Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. 
REV 913 (2007) (showing commercial industry leaders leverage contracting power to 
impose environmental practices on foreign suppliers); Michael P. Vandenbergh, The 
Private Life of Public Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029 (2005) (expanding the scope of the 
regulatory state to include private, “second-order” agreements between commercial 
parties, who assume public regulatory roles to better serve their private interests and avoid 
market and social sanctions). 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 62–63, 65–66. 
25 See, e.g., Kysar, supra note 20 (discussing ecological economics and how traditional 
economic methods do not account for absolute limits on capacities of the natural 
environment). 
26 For example, environmental impact concerns intergenerational fairness, such as 
expressed by the Iroquois practice of testing decisions for effects seven generations 
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to the extent that standardized forms of financial transactions fund 
recurring land uses that many find problematic, the terms and 
structures of the transactions themselves should be a subject of critical 
inquiry. 
I 
DEBT FINANCE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES 
The relationship between debt finance and environmental impact is 
a function of two concepts that are foundational to commercial 
financing transactions: (1) secured lenders’ monitoring and directive 
power, and (2) limited liability.  The monitoring function of secured 
lenders can make them effective predictors and mitigators of 
environmental harm.  At the same time, the common practice of 
limiting liability surrounding a project or venture funded by debt 
finance—by isolating liabilities to a special-purpose entity, the assets 
of which are assigned to lenders—can make lenders the most 
immediate financial risk bearers in a commercial undertaking. 
Many scholars and practitioners have found that these two facets of 
secured lending create a nexus between secured lenders and debtors’ 
environmental impact.27  Few have taken the step of challenging the 
prevailing notion that effects of transactions are not the province of 
debt finance law. 
Part I.A explains the roles of monitoring and limited liability in 
commercial debt finance.  Part I.B then moves forward to question the 
pervasive idea that commercial finance law need not concern itself 
with the environmental effects of applications of capital raised with 
secured debt. 
Commercial actors use the private-law rules governing secured 
debt—most notably UCC Article 9—to enter into transactions with a 
wide range of effects, some good and some bad on many different 
fronts—social, environmental, psychic, etc.  Demonstrating the 
relationship between secured lenders and the environmental 
 
subsequent.  Joaggquisho (Oren Lyons), Scanno, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 334 (2010); see 
also Kristen A. Carpenter et al., In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009); 
Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The Role of 
Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 272–76 
(1996). 
27 See infra Part I.A. 
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consequences of activities they fund requires grappling with several 
fundamental questions. 
Part I.B states and discusses the following questions in turn: First, 
how can we say that secured transactions law, primarily UCC Article 
9, itself escalates commercial activity and hence its environmental 
impact?  Second, even if UCC Article 9 does escalate certain forms of 
commercial activity, why should the UCC get into the business of 
designing rules with a view toward the effects of the transactions it 
governs?  By what logic are threats to the environment, for example, a 
UCC problem? 
Environmental concerns are typically the province of regulation.  
In recent years, largely in response to climate change, the set of 
regulators and regulatory mechanisms has diversified beyond a 
centralized top-down approach.28  Depending on one’s perspective, to 
limit certain forms of development for environmental reasons by 
making changes to secured transactions law could be to “regulate” by 
means not traditionally associated with regulation.  Different 
regulatory subjects enable different degrees and modes of regulation. 
A.  Secured Lenders, Monitoring, and Limited Liability 
An extensive literature discusses the monitoring function of 
secured creditors.29  Scholars have focused on monitoring costs in 
 
28 For example, a majority of U.S. states enact climate change legislation, and numerous 
state and local governments and industry organizations have adopted rules and standards 
designed to improve environmental sustainability.  See Heather Hughes, Enabling 
Investment in Environmental Sustainability, 85 IND. L.J. 597, 600–01 nn.19–20, 636 
(2010); U.S. States and Regions, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://www.pewclimate.org/states-regions (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (providing a state-
by-state survey of this legislation).  Some scholars associate this proliferation of regulatory 
actors with the federal government’s failure to respond to climate change during the Bush 
administration.  See, e.g., Patrick Parenteau, Lead, Follow, or Get out of the Way: The 
States Tackle Climate Change with Little Help from Washington, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1453, 
1471 (2008).  Climate change legislation aside, numerous scholars have criticized the top-
down, federal-government-driven approach to environmental regulation.  For example, 
Todd Zywicki has argued that certain special interest groups benefit from the top-down 
regime, which permits rent seeking and division of gains among special interest players 
and discourages decentralized, market-based alternatives.  See Todd J. Zywicki, 
Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The Political Economy of 
Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845 (1999). 
29 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate 
Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured 
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theories that set out to explain secured transactions.30  Borrowing on a 
secured, as opposed to an unsecured, basis entails a variety of costs 
(including costs of monitoring).31  Many discussions of the 
corresponding benefits of secured credit focus on how secured debt 
can reduce agency costs.32  Secured creditors can monitor debtors and 
threaten foreclosure on assets if a debtor engages in risk-altering 
behavior, underinvests to maximize its own profits at the expense of a 
joint venturer, or threatens opportunistic default.33 
For purposes of understanding how the law currently conceives of 
the relationship between secured lending and debtors’ environmental 
impact, it is primarily important to understand that secured creditors 
have monitoring and directive power over debtors.  Much of the 
scholarship referenced above concerns efficiencies and inefficiencies 
of secured credit.  But regardless of whether secured credit induces 
efficiencies through monitoring, the fact that secured lending 
 
Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1997); Richard Squire, The Case for Symmetry in 
Creditors’ Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 806 (2009). 
30 As Richard Squire notes, “Although several scholars have argued that the secured 
loan promotes creditor monitoring efficiencies, they have disagreed about which creditors 
it encourages to monitor.”  Squire, supra note 29, at 850 (summarizing and contesting 
prior monitoring theories); see also F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. 
L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1986) (arguing that secured debt is efficient and that it, paradoxically, 
appears to increase monitoring costs); Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, 
Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1150–51 (1979) 
(dismissing creditor monitoring in relation to costs of borrowing and stating that the 
existence of collateral is likely to reduce monitoring costs); Levmore, supra note 29, at 
50–59 (arguing that secured credit induces efficient levels of monitoring because it 
addresses freeriding considerations); Mann, supra note 29, at 650–51 (investigating 
parties’ motivations for using secured credit and discussing how collateral narrows the 
focus of a creditor’s monitoring). 
31 These include transaction costs of taking and perfecting a security interest, costs of 
monitoring, and opportunity costs to the debtor.  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. 
Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 
857, 877 (1996). 
32 Other theories have proposed that secured credit enables companies to redistribute 
value away from non-adjusting and non-consenting creditors, enabling the debtor to obtain 
a lower interest rate while externalizing costs onto these unsecured parties.  For a summary 
of this scholarship, see Hughes, supra note 20, at 712–14; Yair Listokin, Is Secured Debt 
Used to Redistribute Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis, 57 
DUKE L.J. 1037 (2008) (finding that firms with high tort risk do not issue more secured 
debt than other firms, negating the redistribution theory of secured credit).  See also 
Squire, supra note 29, at 838–42 (stating that debtor opportunism in shifting costs to non-
adjusting creditors is the only explanation for the persistence of asymmetrical asset 
partitioning). 
33 See Listokin, supra note 32, at 1047. 
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agreements enable monitoring of debtors puts secured lenders in a 
position to anticipate, and potentially control, companies’ 
environmental impacts. 
Secured creditors monitor debtors in a number of ways.  They 
require debtors to report any events or actions that affect the value of 
their collateral or a debtor’s ability to repay a loan.  They search lien 
records.  They require debtors to provide statements of compliance 
with all loan covenants as a condition to disbursement of funds.  They 
require debtors to submit periodic financial statements or other 
reports evidencing the financial condition of the debtor.  Loan 
covenants typically include requirements to report any potential 
liabilities (including, of course, environmental liabilities). 
Loan covenants and monitoring activities are not merely about 
reporting the status of the debtor.  They are also about enabling 
secured lenders to direct a debtor’s behavior in situations where a 
debtor’s activities or external circumstances are jeopardizing a 
secured lender’s expected return on its investment.  Because secured 
transactions typically create significant monitoring power with 
respect to debtors’ activities and assets, they put secured lenders in a 
strong position to identify and deter bad behavior. 
The concept of debtor misbehavior typically refers to behavior that 
alters a lender’s risk, such as applying proceeds of a loan in ways the 
lender did not anticipate or engaging in misrepresentation or even 
fraud.  If a debtor creates environmental costs, this could indicate 
debtor misbehavior to the extent that these costs result from 
unanticipated actions or jeopardize the debtor’s ability to pay or the 
value of assigned assets. 
Many secured lenders use loan covenants to ensure that debtors are 
not creating environmental costs in excess of what the parties expect.  
For example, if a company seeks to own and operate a manufacturing 
facility funded with secured debt, the facility has likely been subject 
to an environmental impact assessment.  If the debtor creates risk of 
environmental liability in excess of what the assessment anticipates, 
this will likely constitute an event of default under a loan and security 
agreement.  The debtor would be obligated by contract to inform its 
secured lender of the potential liability. 
Nothing obligates a secured lender to respond or to remedy the 
situation when a debtor causes this type of event of default.  The 
questions of whether to call the loan, whether to become involved 
with the debtor’s affairs, or whether to request more detailed 
information are all entirely within the lender’s discretion. 
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Given the degrees of monitoring power and control over debtors’ 
behaviors that secured lenders can have, the law contemplates secured 
party liability for environmental costs in certain situations.  
Specifically, a lender can be liable if its debtor causes environmental 
damage that creates liability under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),34 during a 
time when the secured lender exercised a degree of control sufficient 
to make it an “owner or operator” within the meaning of the statute.35  
The idea is that when a debtor pollutes, if that debtor’s secured lender 
was directing the debtor’s activities to a sufficient extent, then 
liability for clean up extends to the secured lender.36 
 
34 CERCLA was enacted originally in 1980.  42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).  The 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) amended CERCLA on October 
17, 1986.  Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 
100 Stat. 1613.  The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act 
(Brownfields Amendments) amended it further in 2002.  Small Business Liability Relief 
and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002). 
35 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4). 
36 In addition to liability under CERCLA, secured lenders may also be liable for 
hazardous substance cleanup under a state “Superfund” statute.  Numerous states have 
enacted such statutes, some of which create a lien in favor of the state that takes priority 
over security interests.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-451 to 452c (West 
2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 13 (West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
147-B:10, 147-B:10-b, (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f(f) (West 2011).  Also, 
academics have proposed granting to environmental claimants priority under UCC Article 
9.  Under these proposals, if a debtor becomes insolvent, environmental claims would be 
satisfied out of the debtor’s assets before secured lenders’ claims are satisfied.  See, e.g., 
Kathryn R. Heidt, Cleaning up Your Act: Efficiency Considerations in the Battle for the 
Debtor’s Assets in Toxic Waste Bankruptcies, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 819, 822 (1988); 
Kathryn R. Heidt, Corrective Justice from Aristotle to Second Order Liability: Who 
Should Pay When the Culpable Cannot?, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 348 (1990); 
LoPucki, supra note 12 (arguing for priority for tort claims generally).  Some state 
Superfund statutes enact “super liens” that give the government’s claim for cleanup costs 
priority over secured lenders.  Where these liens do arise, they can subordinate a secured 
lender’s claim to the government’s claim.  These liens arise only in the specific context of 
state Superfund cleanup of contaminated sites.  Proposals that legal scholars have made for 
tort claim priority or environmental claim priority, in contrast, could apply across contexts 
involving tort or environmental liability.  See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-452a; 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2281 (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1371 (West 
2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E, § 13; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.20138 
(West 2011); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10-b (Supp. 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58-
10-23.11f(f) (West 2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 292.81(3), (4) (West 2011).  Jonathan Remy 
Nash reports: “[I]n the late 1980s the trend toward proliferation of superlien statutes 
subsided. . . . Some states have repealed their superlien statutes, and only one state has 
enacted a superlien statute since the end of 1990.”  Jonathan Remy Nash, Environmental 
Superliens and the Problem of Mortgage-Backed Securitization, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
127, 131–32 (2002). 
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CERCLA created a “Superfund” to enable government cleanup of 
contaminated sites and then recover costs from the parties responsible 
for the pollution.37  CERCLA designates as parties responsible 
present and past owners or operators of contaminated sites.38 
The statute reflects the prevailing notion that lenders are not 
responsible for effects of debtors’ actions.  It excludes from the scope 
of owner or operator “a person, who, without participating in the 
management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership 
primarily to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.”39  
This provision creates, in essence, a security-interest-holder 
exemption. 
Yet, the statute does not simply exempt secured lenders from 
liability altogether.  Rather, it requires distinction between situations 
in which secured lenders merely hold indicia of ownership versus 
situations in which secured lenders participate in management to an 
extent sufficient to create liability.  CERCLA liability may extend to 
secured lenders in two general ways.  A secured lender can (1) 
become involved in the management of a debtor’s affairs such that it 
“participates in the management of a vessel or facility” to an extent 
 
37 CERCLA creates strict liability and joint-and-several liability.  The EPA may recover 
costs from one responsible party, leaving that party to seek contributions from others.  See 
generally United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557–58 (11th Cir. 1990), 
(finding a secured creditor subject to CERCLA liability) superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601(F)(i)(II), as recognized in Monarch Tile, Inc. v. City of Florence, 212 F.3d 1219 
(2000); Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556, 560–62 (W.D. Pa. 
1989) (finding a bank, which is a secured creditor of a polluted site, could be liable under 
CERCLA); Bruce P. Howard & Melissa K. Gerard, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: 
Sorting out the Mixed Signals, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (1991) (explaining how, 
until recently, federal district courts generally interpreted CERCLA to exempt a lender 
from liability unless it was involved in the day-to-day operations of the facility); Susan M. 
King, Lenders' Liability for Cleanup Costs, 18 ENVTL. L. 241, 266–74 (1988) (discussing 
legal risks to lenders under CERCLA); Roslyn Tom, Note, Interpreting the Meaning of 
Lender Management Participation Under Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 
925, 943–44 (1989) (stating reasons why the liability of lenders should be triggered by 
activities suggesting ownership). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4).  The statute defines “owner or operator” as a range of 
parties, including present and past owners, generators of hazardous substances sent to 
sites, and certain transporters of such substances.  Id. § 9601(20)(A).  CERCLA imposes 
liability on four types of responsible parties: current owners or operators of a vessel or 
facility; those who owned or operated a facility at the time hazardous waste was disposed 
of or deposited; persons who arranged by contract to have hazardous substances 
transported to, disposed of, stored, or treated at a facility owned or operated by someone 
else; and transporters.  Id. § 9607(a)(1)–(4). 
39 Id. § 9601(20)(A). 
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that removes the lender from the so-called security-interest 
exemption, or (2) foreclose and become the owner of a site (rather 
than a security interest holder with mere “indicia of ownership”).40  
The scope of situations in which lenders are liable under CERCLA 
has not always been clear,41 though amendments to the statute, passed 
in 199642 and 2002,43 have alleviated much uncertainty.44 
 
40 See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CERCLA, BROWNFIELDS, AND LENDER LIABILITY, 
(2007), available at www.epa.gov/brownfields/aai/lenders_factsheet.pdf. 
41 Early cases disagreed on whether to distinguish a secured lender’s exercise of 
financial controls from participation in operational affairs.  In 1990, United States v. Fleet 
Factors Corp. held that a secured lender could be liable as an operator “by participating in 
the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the 
corporation’s treatment of hazardous wastes.  It is not necessary for the secured creditor 
actually to involve itself in the day-to-day operations of the facility in order to be liable      
. . . .”  Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d at 1557.  The Fleet Factors approach was not 
universally adopted.  In another 1990 case, In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., the Ninth Circuit 
held that “there must be some actual management of the facility before a secured creditor 
will fall outside the [security interest] exception [in section 101(A)(20)].”  Hill v. E. 
Asiatic Co. (In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.), 910 F.2d 668, 672 (9th Cir. 1990).  The EPA 
responded to Fleet Factors by promulgating rules to negate the case, but the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals then ruled in Kelley v. EPA that the EPA lacked the authority under 
CERCLA to make substantive rules limiting lenders’ liability for costs of hazardous-waste 
cleanups.  See Kelley v. EPA, 25 F.3d 1088, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
42 The Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance Protection Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9607), 
amended CERCLA to establish that “participation in management” does not include 
activities like property inspection, giving financial advice, or requiring a debtor to respond 
to contamination.  A secured lender participates in management of a debtor for CERCLA 
liability purposes, according to EPA guidelines, if it “exercises decision-making control 
over a property’s environmental compliance, or exercises control at a level similar to that 
enjoyed by a manager of the facility or property.”  ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 40. 
 With respect to foreclosure, the 1996 amendments state that foreclosing on a property 
does not make a secured lender an “owner or operator” under CERCLA, provided that the 
bank takes steps to sell the property “at the earliest practicable, commercially reasonable 
time, on commercially reasonable terms.”  Id.  A secured creditor that has foreclosed may 
maintain business activities and wind down operations on a site without becoming an 
“owner or operator” under CERCLA, as long as the secured lender lists the property for 
sale at the earliest practicable, commercially reasonable time.  Id. 
43 In 2002, Congress passed the Brownfields Amendments, further clarifying the range 
of situations in which secured creditors will be liable by creating new landowner liability 
protection (for owners who purchase property after it has been contaminated by someone 
else).  Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002). 
44 The way in which CERCLA implicates secured lenders creates some interesting 
tensions.  The issue is, on the one hand, respecting banks’ positions as outside financers 
who make investments and provide funds but are not responsible for debtors’ actions, 
while at the same time holding banks liable in situations in which they were in control of a 
contaminating facility such that they are appropriate bearers of liability. 
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If secured lenders were excluded categorically from CERCLA 
liability, it could create moral hazard.  Secured lenders and debtors 
could deliberately effectuate conveyance of a first-priority interest in 
the debtor’s assets, knowing that the debtor may pollute for profit and 
externalize cleanup costs to the government.45  Yet, if secured lenders 
were categorically included in CERCLA’s definition of owners and 
operators, then lenders would have incentive to call defaults in 
situations in which they might otherwise use their power to aid 
debtors in avoiding or mitigating costs. 
The relevance of CERCLA here is simply to show that the law 
already acknowledges secured lenders’ capacity for monitoring and 
directing debtors’ activities.  It assigns liability for environmental 
harm to secured parties in certain circumstances as a result. 
While a secured party can have monitoring power and control over 
a debtor in any secured transaction, secured parties commonly 
establish these powers in transactions in which the parties use a 
limited-liability special-purpose or project entity to protect a company 
from risks associated with a given venture.  In these very common 
transactions, we can conceive of the secured lender as the party with 
the most immediate financial stake in the debtor’s activities. 
The concept of limited liability is crucial to contemporary 
commercial financing transactions.  “Structured finance” refers to 
transactions in which a company seeking to raise capital from lenders 
transfers assets to a limited liability entity such as a corporation or an 
LLC.  The lenders then assess the credit of the entity apart from that 
of its parent or owners.  In transactions to fund projects, new 
facilities, new developments, or the like, lenders fund the activity 
undertaken by the special entity, taking a security interest in its assets 
(and not necessarily in any assets of the parent).  Of course a 
transaction may create recourse to assets of a parent company, equity 
holder or other party, but the model of lending against the value of 
assets held by a limited liability entity with recourse only to such 
assets is commonplace. 
When a lender has a security interest in all assets of a limited 
liability entity, it becomes an immediate bearer of financial risk.  The 
 
45 CERCLA provides that a federal government lien imposed by the statute “shall be 
subject to the rights of any purchaser, holder of a security interest, or judgment lien 
creditor whose interest is perfected under applicable State law before notice of the lien has 
been filed.”  42 U.S.C. § 9607(l)(3). 
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parent or owners have not expended their own funds to undertake the 
project—the secured lender has.  The secured lender should be first to 
be repaid.  Failure of a project that causes default on a loan directly 
affects secured lenders; they cannot go after other parties or assets to 
recoup their investment (in a limited-recourse transaction). 
Securitization transactions rely on limited-liability special-purpose 
entities to separate assets from liabilities with the goal of enhancing 
credit.  A company seeking to securitize rights to payment, for 
example, sells these rights to a separate special-purpose entity.  These 
assets are thereby separated from any liabilities of the company as a 
going concern.  The separate special-purpose entity then issues debt 
instruments secured by the rights to payment.  The company can raise 
more capital against the value of the assets in the hands of the limited 
liability entity than it could if the assets were on its own books, 
because the special-purpose entity has no liabilities to discount from 
the assets’ value. 
The use of limited-liability special-purpose entities to isolate assets 
is ubiquitous in commercial finance.  For purposes of this discussion, 
the relevance of limited liability structures in finance is that they 
allow companies to shift the risk associated with any given venture to 
the secured lenders.  Risks are isolated to a project entity, and the 
cash for that entity’s activities comes from secured lenders.  Owners 
of the entity take any upside, such as profits in excess of the loan 
obligations.  Owners minimize exposure to losses by seeking lenders 
to fund the project. 
Lenders, of course, enjoy the upside of their expected return on 
investment—repayment with interest—assuming there is not a 
default.  If a debtor does default, lenders can foreclose on assets.  
Lenders also protect themselves against risk by creating diversified 
portfolios of loans that they can sell to participating investors, either 
with securitization transactions or through syndication. 
Companies can transfer risks associated with any given project to 
secured lenders, and secured lenders are not liable for effects of 
applications of capital that they provide.  If a project entity46 causes 
environmental harm, its parent company or owners can be isolated 
 
46 Project entities are limited liability entities formed for the sole purpose of developing, 
owning and operating a particular project.  See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING 
SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF 
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (2005), available at http://www.bis 
.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf. 
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from liability; lenders funded the activities that resulted in harm, but 
they are only liable in the limited situations involving hazardous 
waste cleanup, as discussed above.  Because of this reality, 
institutional lenders have taken it upon themselves to articulate 
responsibility for avoiding environmental harm that could result from 
projects they fund. 
A long list of project financers has adopted the Equator 
Principles—standards for secured lending that include a commitment 
to fund only projects that meet certain environmental criteria.47  A 
separate list of major institutional lenders has adopted the Carbon 
Principles—commitments to undertake heightened due diligence 
regarding environmental impact when financing fossil fuel generation 
projects.48  The Equator Principles apply in the context of 
transnational project finance.49  The Carbon Principles apply, so far, 
only to North American power generation projects.50 
It is unknown, at the moment, what the effects of the Equator 
Principles and the Carbon Principles will be.  Though the Equator 
Principles require subscribing banks to include in project loan 
documentation covenants under which the borrower agrees to 
maintain compliance with articulated environmental (and other) 
standards, there is no obligation on the part of the lender to call an 
event of default if such covenant were breached.51  There are many 
difficulties in enforcing nonfinancial defaults, like default in 
compliance with an environmental standard that does not create 
potential legal liability.  With respect to the Carbon Principles, banks 
may just be trying to minimize costs surrounding debtors’ compliance 
with anticipated regulation, or they may be attempting to influence 
 
47 EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS’N, supra note 19.  Numerous major U.S. and foreign 
lenders such as Bank of America, ABN AMRO, and Wells Fargo are Equator Principles 
financial institutions. 
48 See THE CARBON PRINCIPLES: FOSSIL FUEL GENERATION FINANCING ENHANCED 
ENVIRONMENTAL DILIGENCE PROCESS, available at www.carbonprinciples.org (the 
principles were developed by Citi, JPMorgan Chase, and Morgan Stanley with help from 
leading power companies and environmental organizations); see, e.g., Bank of Am., supra 
note 19. 
49 See EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS’N, supra note 19. 
50 The subscribing banks “decided to focus on power generation in North America 
because of attention to this market by legislators and other stakeholders,” but may extend 
the principles to other markets.  CARBON PRINCIPLES Q & A, at Questions 11–12, 
available at http://www.carbonprinciples.org/documents/Carbon%20Principles%20QA 
.pdf. 
51 See EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS’N, supra note 19. 
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the content of that regulation by proactively establishing the extent of 
diligence they are willing to undertake.52 
The relevance of the Equator and the Carbon Principles here is 
simply to show that secured parties themselves recognize that in 
transactional contexts in which the debtor is an entity formed to 
isolate liability surrounding certain activities, secured parties can be 
the primary parties taking financial risk and controlling for things like 
environmental impact. 
Again, the law here reflects the notion that effects of project 
financing transactions are not relevant to commercial finance law 
itself.  Secured lenders are electing to acknowledge their relationship 
to the environmental impact of debtors’ activities with the Equator 
and the Carbon Principles.  Nothing in the law obligates or enforces 
this acknowledgement. 
The purpose here is not to argue for assignment of liability for 
environmental harm to secured lenders.  In this Part, the goal is 
simply to understand the current relationship between lenders and 
environmental costs. 
The remainder of this Part shifts focus to challenge the notion that 
commercial finance law should facilitate transactions without regard 
for transactions’ environmental effects.  This is not the same as 
challenging the extent to which secured lenders are isolated from 
liability for environmental harm caused by debtors.  The inquiry here 
is not about whether to extend liability to secured lenders but whether 
the private law rules that constitute commercial finance law could 
themselves contemplate transactions’ effects. 
B.  What Is a Debt Finance Law Issue, and What Is Not? 
Lawmakers tend to conceive of environmental issues in terms of 
environmental regulation and not in terms of commercial law.  The 
task here is to explore and to challenge the logic of this separation of 
environmental concerns from commercial finance concerns. 
 
52 A statement from subscribing banks entitled “Carbon Principles Q & A” reports: “We 
believe it is important to provide a framework for clients and financers in this interim 
period while legislation is being crafted and that the experience derived from the 
Principles could also help inform the development of new and revised policy.”  CARBON 
PRINCIPLES Q & A, supra note 50, at Question 8.  The banks believe that fossil fuel 
generation plants will be subject to more onerous legislation in the near future.  Objectives 
of the Carbon Principles may include limiting the extent of this reform by creating and 
implementing standards in advance that are acceptable to the industry. 
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This logic is steeped in the notion that commercial law is a tool that 
can be used for a range of ends.53  It does not itself increase or 
decrease the number of transactions, nor does it affect whether the 
proceeds of any given transaction are applied to alleviate or to 
aggravate environmental harm.  In order to demonstrate, ultimately, a 
relationship between contemporary financing practices in real estate 
and a controversial outcome like suburban sprawl, it is necessary to 
first ask foundational questions about the scope of commercial law 
itself. 
The commercial finance law primarily discussed here is UCC 
Article 9, governing extensions of credit secured by personal 
property.  Many commercial finance transactions purport to effectuate 
a sale, such as in the context of sale-leaseback transactions for the 
financing of equipment.  Securitization transactions involve two 
steps: (1) a sale of assets to the special-purpose entity, and (2) a 
simultaneous assignment by that entity of a security interest in the 
assets to investors.  Though these kinds of transactions are not simple 
secured loans, they nonetheless implicate Article 9.  In the context of 
securitization, the special-purpose entity typically issues secured debt 
instruments.54  In the context of sale-leaseback transactions, the 
buyer/lessor typically complies with the Article 9 requirements for 
creation and perfection of a security interest.  Depending on the 
economic substance of a particular transaction, if the seller/lessee 
were to become insolvent, a court could find the transaction to be a 
secured loan governed by Article 9 (as opposed to a sale and lease).55 
Also, because UCC Article 9 concerns loans secured by personal 
property (not realty), many do not realize its significance in the 
context of real estate finance.  Developers very frequently form 
special-purpose or project entities to hold title to real estate.  They 
then raise capital to develop the real estate by assigning security 
interests in the equity of the project entity—an assignment governed 
 
53 See Hughes, supra note 20 (discussing the law-as-tool metaphor in terms of an 
instrumentalist aesthetic in commercial law); Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the 
Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 973 (2005) 
(discussing the metaphor of law as a tool, and aesthetic practices, in the context of 
conflicts-of-law doctrine). 
54 Also, depending on the level of recourse in the sales contract between the special-
purpose entity and the originator, that sales contract could in some cases be characterized 
as a secured loan.  See generally JAMES J. WHITE, SECURED TRANSACTIONS: TEACHING 
MATERIALS, 282–303 (3d ed. 2006). 
55 See id. at 46–67. 
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by Article 9.  This is true even though the entity is a shell that has no 
assets or function other than holding title to land.  Article 9 governs 
the real estate mezzanine loans discussed in Part II.B. 
1.  How Can We Say that UCC Article 9 Itself Escalates Commercial 
Activity? 
On the one hand, companies set out to undertake whatever projects 
and activities further their goals.  If secured debt financing were not 
available to fund these undertakings, then, presumably, some other 
type of financing or source of capital would be. 
On the other hand, the fact that much commercial activity, as we 
know it, could exist without Article 9 does not negate the facilitating 
role that Article 9 currently plays for many commercial undertakings.  
Article 9 provides a set of rules that make certain forms of secured 
lending expeditious.  To claim that it does not, then, escalate the 
number (and therefore the effects) of the transactions it governs 
would be to deny Article 9’s own objectives and success. 
UCC Article 9 decreases transaction costs by setting out uniform 
rules for extensions of credit secured by personal property.  
Decreasing transaction costs is not necessarily linked to increasing the 
volume of commercial activity.  Yet, at the same time, escalation of 
certain types of commercial activity is widely associated with the 
enactment of Article 9.  Homer Kripke56 asserts that “the legal 
structure of secured credit developed to make possible mass 
production and the distribution of goods.”57  It would be inconsistent 
to declare that secured transactions law makes mass production 
possible, while at the same time deny that these rules escalate 
commercial activity. 
Commentators who doubt that secured transactions rules 
themselves escalate commercial activity may disagree with Kripke.  
But if one recognizes Article 9’s facilitating effect on secured debt 
financing, then it would be inconsistent to at the same time maintain 
that this law does not, to some extent, escalate commercial activity. 
 
56 Kripke was influential in the drafting of Article 9; he served as a member of the 
Permanent Editorial Board for UCC Article 9.  See Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A 
History of the Uniform Commercial Code 1949–1954, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 359 (2001); 
Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321 (1962). 
57 Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of 
Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 931 n.14 (1985). 
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2.  Even if UCC Article 9 Does Escalate Certain Forms of 
Commercial Activity, Why Should Article 9 Contemplate Effects of the 
Transactions It Governs? 
Well, in a sense, it already does.  Practitioners and commentators 
tend to regard Article 9 as a set of technical rules to facilitate secured 
lending without regard for effects of any given transaction, positive or 
negative.  But the UCC does contain numerous provisions aimed at 
avoiding or producing certain effects in the contexts of particular 
types of deals.58  The Code was drafted with certain effects in mind, 
such as decreases in transaction costs or increases in interstate 
transactions (in response to uniformity). 
The question, then, is whether there is some essential difference 
between the kinds of effects the UCC contemplates and, for example, 
environmental effects of the transactions it governs.  One difference, 
perhaps, is that the effects the UCC contemplates concern, primarily, 
effectuating transactions themselves.  The transactions’ effects, we 
might say, are another story.  Aside from a generalized commitment 
to the idea that growth is good, the effects the UCC deliberately 
generates are primarily effects on commercial transactions, not effects 
of commercial transactions. 
But this distinction between effects on transactions and effects of 
transactions is not necessarily a viable one.  Reducing transaction 
costs is not a neutral objective.  Scholars and lawmakers have 
vigorously debated whether UCC Article 9 should be reformed in 
light of certain distributive consequences/effects of transactions 
governed by its full-priority floating lien rules.59 
Article 9 lowers costs of secured transactions by enabling lenders 
to take a security interest in a wide range of assets with one 
conveyance.  This security interest is “full priority,” meaning that the 
secured lender can recover the full value of its interest if the debtor 
defaults, before other creditors recover at all.  If the security interest 
covers after-acquired collateral (as Article 9 permits), this security 
interest is a “floating lien,”60 meaning that the lender’s lien attaches 
 
58 See infra text accompanying notes 67–70. 
59 See infra notes 62–65 and accompanying text. 
60 “Floating lien” is a shorthand, not a statutory, term for a security interest that attaches 
to after-acquired collateral and for which the Code dates priority for future advances by 
the lender back to the date the lender first filed a UCC-1 financing statement or perfected 
its interest.  See U.C.C. §§ 9-204 to -205, -323 (2005). 
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automatically to assets acquired after closing of the transaction.  
Priority of the lender’s interest in after-acquired collateral dates back 
to the original filing the lender made in the UCC lien registry to give 
notice of its interest61—in UCC terms, to perfect its interest to 
establish priority. 
Scholars have argued that the effects of transactions governed by 
these rules are both unfair and inefficient because they disadvantage 
non-adjusting creditors.  Non-adjusting creditors are unsecured 
creditors that lack the opportunity to adjust their rate of return in 
response to the risk presented by an Article 9 secured creditor.  
Typical non-adjusting creditors include tort claimants, employees, 
and retirees.  In terms of efficiency, scholars have contended that 
Article 9 artificially depresses the interest rates lenders charge.62  In 
terms of fairness, scholars have questioned whether Article 9 creditors 
ought to recover the full value of their investments in advance of any 
recovery by unsecured creditors.63 
Lawmakers have not revised Article 9 in response to these 
arguments;64 the full priority structure prevails.  What is interesting 
 
61 Id. 
62 See Squire, supra note 29, at 844–67; cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Jesse M. Fried, 
The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and 
a Reply to Critics, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1279, 1290 (1997) (discussing how costs of full 
priority can result in inefficient contracting between borrowers and lenders); Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1899 (1994) 
(discussing the positions of non-adjusting creditors).  But see Listokin, supra note 32 
(examining the redistribution theory of secured credit with empirical assessment of the 
prevalence of secured debt among “high-tort” firms); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case 
for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997) (arguing that 
secured credit creates value for unsecured creditors). 
63 See Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial 
Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605, 615–18 (1981); 
LoPucki, supra note 12; Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The 
Article 9 Full Priority Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373 (1997). 
64 Neither has the bankruptcy code, despite proposals made by Senator Richard J. 
Durbin (D-Ill.) and Representative William D. Delahunt (D-Mass.) during the bankruptcy 
reform process in 2002.  See Employee Abuse Prevention Act of 2002, S. 2798, 107th 
Cong. (2002); H.R. 5221, 107th Cong. (2002).  This bill would have enabled a bankruptcy 
trustee to include assets assigned to a perfected secured creditor in the bankruptcy estate 
under certain circumstances.  It was presented as a way to protect workers and retirees 
from corporate misconduct.  See Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The 
Unfortunate Life and Merciful Death of the Avoidance Powers Under Section 103 of the 
Durbin-Delahunt Bill: What Were They Thinking?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1829, 1829 n.2 
(2004).  The Durbin-Delahunt bill was criticized by organizations such as the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), the Bond Market 
Association, and the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation, and the Options Clearing 
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for purposes of this work is that opponents of these arguments about 
Article 9 and non-adjusting creditors do not argue that the role of the 
UCC is to reduce transaction costs without regard to its effects.  The 
idea that bad effects of transactions are grounds for reforming the 
commercial law rules seems uncontroversial in the context of the 
secured transactions literature on this issue.  Opponents take issue 
with the conclusion that secured transactions, per current Article 9 
rules, are actually either inefficient or unfair.65  The debate is not, on 
the one hand, arguments for reform in light of effects of secured 
transactions and, on the other hand, arguments against reform on 
ground that effects are not the province of the UCC.  Rather, the 
debate is between scholars who maintain that Article 9 rules enable 
transactions that produce unfair and inefficient results and scholars 
who assert that these transactions do not produce unfair or inefficient 
results—or, at least, that the effects they do produce are extremely 
valuable and would be jeopardized by reform.  This recent debate 
over effects of full-priority secured transactions highlights the 
continuity of questions about the effects of rules on transactions and 
the effects of transactions themselves.66 
One more point is in order here about the distinction between UCC 
rules designed to produce effects on transactions—such as lowering 
transaction costs—versus rules geared toward effects of 
transactions—the real-world consequences of transactions.  The UCC 
does not simply lower transaction costs across the board without 
regard for the effects of the transactions it is making less costly.  The 
UCC privileges some kinds of transactions over others because the 
effects of some transactions are, apparently, more desirable than 
others. 
 
Corporation.  Id. at 1831 (arguing that the Durbin-Delahunt bill was much more expansive 
in its attempt to avoid the interests of secured creditors in bankruptcy than the bill’s 
sponsors had indicated).  Its sponsors withdrew the bill in early September 2002.  Id. 
65 See David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179, 
2182 (1994) (arguing that ordinary price theory shows that secured lending is rational); 
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security 
Interests: Taking Debtors’ Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 2021, 2024–25 (1994) 
(replying to fairness concerns by arguing that security interests are a form of property 
interest, alienable despite effects on third parties); Schwarcz, supra note 62 (on the 
efficiency of secured lending). 
66 Part II will delve into more detail regarding the relationship between a particular type 
of real estate development finance and the effects of the projects it funds. 
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The Code expressly privileges, for example, financing secured by 
rights to payment over contracts in which parties agree to prohibitions 
on assignment.  The result is reduced transaction costs for deals like 
receivables securitization at the expense of fidelity to contractual 
obligations to account debtors.67 
UCC section 9-408 provides that provisions in promissory notes, 
health-care-insurance receivables, or general intangibles are 
ineffective to the extent that they “would impair the creation, 
attachment, or perfection of a security interest”68 in such assets or 
provide that assignment of a security interest in these assets may give 
rise to default or breach.69  Section 9-408 alters the effects of a 
contractual anti-assignment provision.  Article 9 includes this 
statutory overriding of anti-assignment clauses in order to encourage 
certain modes of financing.70  Under secured transactions law, this 
kind of contract provision cannot prevent creation of a valid security 
interest and is ineffective to create a contractual event of default or 
breach.  Because of section 9-408, companies can assign pools of 
rights to payment to lenders or to special-purpose vehicles for 
purposes of securitization without creating any worry for investors 
over whether the underlying contracts require consent to such 
assignment.  Increasing access to capital by facilitating securitization 
is an effect of section 9-408 that the Code finds more important than 
the potential effects of this section on account debtors.71 
 
67 There is a twist to UCC section 9-408 in that later creditors can take effective security 
interests, but cannot enforce their interests to the detriment of the other party to the 
contract that prohibited assignment.  U.C.C. § 9-408 (2005).  If a debtor is party to an 
agreement that restricts assignment, and the debtor assigns an interest in the agreement 
anyway, the secured creditor cannot enforce its interests to the detriment of the other party 
to the agreement.  But the secured creditor will have a superior position at liquidation.  It 
can wait for disposition of assets if the debtor cannot pay and it will prevail. 
68 Id. (a)(1). 
69 Id. (a)(2). 
70 See id. cmt. 2. 
71 Note that this feature of U.S. commercial law has been a subject of debate in rule-of-
law projects abroad.  See, e.g., Bruce A. Markell, A View from the Field: Some 
Observations on the Effect of International Commercial Law Reform Efforts on the Rule of 
Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 497 (1999).  The laws of many foreign jurisdictions 
do not permit assignment of receivables containing anti-assignment clauses.  These 
jurisdictions often require notice to the account debtor when the account is assigned.  
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) Convention on 
Assignment of Receivables overrides these local law provisions in nations that adopt it, 
but this Convention has not received wide acceptance.  See United Nations Convention on 
the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, G.A. Res., 56/81, U.N. GAOR, 56th 
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3.  By What Logic Is Environmental Impact a UCC Issue? 
Environmental harm does not result from one cause or one actor.  
UCC Article 9 does not “cause” environmental results any more than 
failures of regulation, irresponsible corporate decisions, cultural lack 
of commitment to conservation, or any other facet of the challenge 
that environmental limitations present.  The factors that contribute to 
environmental harm are multiple.  This reality does not justify 
dismissing any one such factor from review. 
Some have observed a failure of commercial finance law to 
facilitate internalization or avoidance of environmental costs.  UCC 
Article 9 was substantially revised in the 1990s and reenacted by state 
legislatures in 2001.72  In the context of this debate, one member of 
the Article 9 Task Force of the ABA Subcommittee on Agriculture 
and Agri-Business Financing, Richard Barnes, cried out against the 
use of floating liens and purchase money security interests (PMSIs)73 
in farm financing.  In a 1993 article, he declared passionately, “The 
farmer’s own interests and those of his secured financers do not 
permit the type of commitment needed to conserve soil and reduce 
water pollution.  Alternatives to the first-in-time priority system and 
the purchase money device are necessary to achieve the national 
commitment to protect soil and water.”74 
The crux of Barnes’s argument is that UCC Article 9 emphasizes 
productivity over ecology in a way that influences how farmers 
conduct their businesses and that limits the effectiveness of laws 
meant to reduce pollution.75  Barnes calls for land stewardship in the 
face of financing rules that enable agricultural practices that aggravate 
nonpoint source water pollution and deterioration of land quality.  But 
his call has been, it seems, largely ignored.  His article has received 
 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/81 (Dec. 12, 2001); Nat’l Law Ctr. for Inter-Am. Free Trade, 
United Nations Group Drafting Secured Transactions Guide, NOVEDADES, June 2006, at 
1. 
72 One topic of much debate during the revision discussions was how to treat 
agricultural liens and security interests in farm assets.  See Hughes, supra note 28, at 609–
10. 
73 A PMSI arises when a secured party’s extension of credit enables the debtor to 
acquire new goods such as inventory or equipment.  PMSIs have the benefit of special 
priority rules that grant them priority in advance of prior, perfected secured creditors with 
interests in after-acquired collateral.  See U.C.C. §§ 9-103, -324 (2008). 
74 Barnes, supra note 20, at 512 (arguing that the unitary security interest and PMSI 
have aggravated environmental destruction of American farmland). 
75 Id. at 511–12. 
HUGHES 1/31/2012  1:01 PM 
388 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 359 
few citations and the UCC drafting committee reports do not appear 
to address environmental concerns in their discussions of the new 
rules for agricultural finance. 
This is not surprising, given major and obvious objections to this 
thinking.  UCC Article 9 is neutral in the sense that it does not 
involve itself in the question of whether the secured transactions it 
governs are, in any given instance, positive-value or negative-value 
transactions.  So, if we think critically about farmers and Article 9 
finance, for example, Barnes argues that PMSIs encourage farmers to 
seek credit beyond what their primary bank lenders will provide in 
order to work the land beyond the point that the bank lenders think is 
appropriate—a point past which, in most cases, the farming activity 
will be environmentally harmful.76  Perhaps this is a reason to limit 
the extent to which, under UCC Article 9, production money or 
purchase money lenders take priority over prior bank lenders in the 
farm financing context. 
But we can just as easily think of a scenario where a primary bank 
lender is unwilling to extend additional credit to a farmer to produce a 
crop because the farmer wants to use new environmentally friendly 
techniques or machines, the results of which are less certain than 
traditional, environmentally hazardous methods.  In this scenario, the 
availability of purchase money or production money credit for which 
the creditor will have a priority position in advance of the primary 
bank lender is a vehicle for sustainable practices.77 
In the abstract, the floating lien and PMSI structure can be used to 
enter into transactions that harm the environment or, conversely, 
transactions that improve the environment.  Yet, the actual results of 
farm practices in recent decades have been detrimental to vast 
amounts of land and water.78  Farmers could not have undertaken 
 
76 See id. at 464–65, 473–96. 
77 We could even craft enabling security-interest rules explicitly tailored for such types 
of investment.  Article 9 could include an “environmental practices money security 
interest” that gives priority to investors extending credit to enable debtors to engage in 
practices specifically geared toward environmental stewardship.  See Hughes, supra note 
28 (exploring the concept of an “environmental practices money security interest” 
modeled on existing production money and PMSI rules). 
78 Barnes, along with others, identifies nonpoint source (NPS) water pollution as a 
serious environmental problem that has not responded adequately to top-down regulation 
because of the dispersed nature of its sources.  See Barnes, supra note 20, at 496–501; J.B. 
Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
263 (2000) (discussing how legal measures fail to respond to agricultural runoff). 
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these practices, it appears, without secured debt financing.  So is this 
a UCC Article 9 problem or not? 
The Code drafters, originally and through subsequent revision 
periods, have held that security interests in farm assets should be 
treated like any other security interest.  Farmers and farm lenders 
should not operate under different financing rules despite the special 
nature of farming, including its relationship to land. 
Barnes’s argument seems to be that UCC Article 9 is complicit in 
environmental harm in that it induces behavior that aggravates 
farming’s negative impact on the environment.  Barnes is not alone in 
making this kind of charge against commercial finance rules.  J. 
William Futrell writes about “law’s prejudice against sustainability” 
and finds that this prejudice continues into the area of finance law.79  
Benjamin J. Richardson makes similar arguments about finance law 
in Canada.80  He states, for example, that although Canada has greatly 
improved its environmental laws since the 1970s, a “lack of 
interaction between environmental and financial policy” creates for 
environmental law a great handicap.81  “Because financial markets 
shape decisions concerning future development and thus resulting 
environmental pressures, the reform of investment, banking, and other 
financial services to promote more environmentally sensitive 
financing should be a government priority.”82 
These perspectives on commercial finance law build upon 
arguments that present environmental harm as a form of market 
failure.83  We can understand Barnes to be making a context-specific 
version of an established argument that we recognize from the 
environmental movement more generally. 
This argument contends that environmental harm is a market 
failure in that market transactions do not reflect costs of this harm.  
 
79 J. William Futrell, The Transition to Sustainable Development Law, 21 PACE ENVTL. 
L. REV. 179, 188 (2003). 
80 See Benjamin J. Richardson, Financing Environmental Change: A New Role for 
Canadian Environmental Law, 49 MCGILL L.J. 145 (2004). 
81 Id. at 147. 
82 Id. 
83 For example, Nicholas Stern’s influential report on climate change states: “Climate 
change presents a unique challenge for economists: it is the greatest and widest-ranging 
market failure ever seen.”  NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i, available at http://webarchive.national 
archives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2011). 
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Negative environmental consequences are externalities of 
transactions—costs that are transferred to the public, not priced into 
transactions themselves.  Because the law permits market actors to 
externalize environmental costs of their transactions, these costs are a 
form of market failure.  The idea here is that a functioning market 
would discipline market actors to account for environmental harm and 
price transactions accordingly. 
In the context of secured transactions, we could say that because 
debtors and secured lenders can enter into transactions that are 
profitable for them but have environmental consequences that are 
costly for the public, they are complicit in this market failure.  Barnes 
finds the full-priority floating lien and PMSI to be collateral security 
devices that encourage just the sort of transactional activity that 
emphasizes short-term financial gains for private parties at the 
expense of harm to farmland.84  So, we could say that threats to the 
environment are a UCC problem in the sense that the rules enacted in 
the UCC enable transactions that externalize environmental costs.85 
This inquiry leads to another consideration.  If environmental harm 
can be a UCC problem, then what about other types of costs the UCC 
rules could address?  It is true that environmental challenges are 
unique and collective; but, at the same time, commercial actors are 
also in a position to alter other kinds of effects of commercial activity. 
Thinking specifically about controversy surrounding suburban 
sprawl, there seems to be a direct connection between developers’ 
incentives, the inability of land-use policies to control sprawl, and 
contemporary real estate finance practices.  When specific 
commercial law rules yield effects that are controversial in particular 
circumstances, we should revisit these rules and consider the 
circumstances.  The fact that commercial law rules may also produce 
other controversial effects does not justify an abandonment of 
commercial finance law to the current constellation of effects that it 
contemplates. 
 
84 See Barnes, supra note 20, at 491. 
85 Part II.C explores this logic in more detail by considering it in the context of a 
specific type of transaction that permits transfer of risk and externalization of costs related 
to controversial environmental results. 
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II 
CONTEXTUALIZED DISCUSSION: FINANCE AND SUBURBIA 
Currently, the task of making value judgments about different 
approaches to growth is largely relegated to local governments and 
communities.  This project suggests that the work of determining 
which approaches to growth are desirable could be taken up at the 
state level. 
A.  Sprawl 
It is virtually impossible to speak categorically about a 
phenomenon as diverse and widespread as suburbanization.86  The 
word “sprawl” has a negative connotation.  Not all suburban 
developments contribute to sprawl, and the concept of sprawl is 
contested.  Though many lament its negative environmental impact,87 
its causes, its benefits, and its drawbacks—attributes fundamental to 
its very definition—are subjects of debate.88 
Below are two working definitions that attempt to capture the 
concept of sprawl. Edwin S. Mills states, “Sprawl means excessive 
suburbanization.  Excessive means more than can be utility 
enhancing.  Of course, how much suburbanization is utility enhancing 
depends on context. . . .  Suburbanization has been both inevitable and 
mostly utility enhancing, but it can also be excessive.”89  This 
definition relates sprawl to excess, and it implies that excess can be 
determined by a context-specific utility calculus (that would 
undoubtedly be highly complex).90 
 
86 “Suburban studies” has produced numerous important texts, including ROBERT 
FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS (1987); HAYDEN, supra note 2; KENNETH T. JACKSON, 
CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985); NATURE 
IN FRAGMENTS: THE LEGACY OF SPRAWL (Elizabeth A. Johnson & Michael W. Klemens 
eds., 2005); ADAM ROME, THE BULLDOZER IN THE COUNTRYSIDE: SUBURBAN SPRAWL 
AND THE RISE OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM (2001). 
87 See, e.g., Stop Sprawl: Reports and Factsheets, SIERRA CLUB, www.sierraclub.org 
/sprawl/reports. 
88 See, e.g., BRUEGMANN, supra note 2; Edwin S. Mills, Sprawl and Jurisdictional 
Fragmentation, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URBAN AFFAIRS: 2006, at 231 
(Gary Burtless & Janet Rothenberg Pack eds., 2006); Timothy J. Dowling, Reflections on 
Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth, and the Fifth Amendment, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 873, 874 
(2000); Jeremy R. Meredith, Sprawl and the New Urbanist Solution, 89 VA. L. REV. 447 
(2003). 
89 Mills, supra note 88. 
90 Id. 
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Taking a different kind of approach, Timothy J. Dowling defines 
sprawl as “low-density, land-consuming, automobile-dependent, 
haphazard, non-contiguous (or ‘leapfrog’) development on the fringe 
of settled areas . . . that intrudes into rural or other undeveloped 
areas.”91  This kind of description is more detached from the concept 
of utility.  In theory, a development could fit Dowling’s definition but 
still provide benefits that outweigh its associated costs.  Dowling 
implies both that sprawl is problematic, regardless of the utility of any 
given development, and that sprawl creates costs to the environment 
or to communities that cannot be captured in a utility calculus.92 
Court decisions on land use regulation have recognized concerns 
that sprawl implicates.  In rejecting a Fifth Amendment takings claim 
against certain zoning ordinances, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated 
that it is clearly legitimate for local governments to discourage “the 
premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban 
uses.”93  Yet, despite the validity of zoning that could effectuate well-
planned growth, sprawl continues.94  In fact, legal scholars have 
observed that most suburban zoning codes tend to promote, rather 
than discourage, sprawl.95 
The Supreme Court has certainly never ordered local governments 
to protect open space; it has merely affirmed governments’ capacity 
to make rules to achieve this end if they so desire.  Nonetheless, the 
Court identified in Agins v. City of Tiburon one of the issues at the 
core of the challenges that sprawling growth presents: premature and 
 
91  Dowling, supra note 88.  Dowling draws on a report by a local government 
association that defines sprawl as “low density, discontinuous, automobile-dependent, new 
development on the fringe of settled areas.”  NAT’L ASS’N OF LOCAL GOV’T ENVTL. 
PROF’LS, PROFILES OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP ON SMART GROWTH: NEW PARTNERSHIPS 
DEMONSTRATE THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF REDUCING SPRAWL 8 (1999). 
92 Dowling, supra note 88, at 887. 
93 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980), overruled by Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (holding that whether a statute substantially 
advances a legitimate state interest is not a valid method of identifying regulatory takings 
for which just compensation is required).  The Court’s 2005 decision altering the nature of 
takings analyses does not detract from the relevance, for this work, of the statement in 
Agins excerpted above. 
94 See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional 
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57 (1999); Henry R. Richmond, Sprawl and Its 
Enemies: Why the Enemies are Losing, 34 CONN. L. REV. 539 (2002). 
95 See Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2000); Gerald 
E. Frug, Against Centralization, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 31 (2000). 
HUGHES 1/31/2012  1:01 PM 
2011] Securitization and Suburbia 393 
unnecessary conversion of open-space land.96  The pace of 
development and the possibilities for premature or unnecessary 
building are related to commercial finance practices like securitization 
and mezzanine lending. 
Many commentators associate sprawl with both environmental and 
social problems.  For example, some scholars focus on sprawl’s 
negative impact on public or civic life.97  Others focus on 
environmental problems associated with sprawl, such as increased 
carbon footprints of both houses themselves and the people living in 
them who need to drive more to reach services and jobs.  Another 
environmental problem associated with sprawl is the consumption of 
natural resources that provide essential ecological services.98 
Numerous scholars have studied the failure of zoning to contain 
growth patterns that are environmentally controversial.99  They 
identify a range of causes for this, including consumer preferences,100 
municipal finance issues, and developers’ use of SLAPP suits.101  J.B. 
Ruhl and James Salzman write, “Every morning in cities across the 
 
96 Agins, 447 U.S. at 261. 
97 See, e.g., DUANY ET AL., supra note 7 (discussing how a physical environment 
defined by sprawling development encourages a lack of community and communal space, 
and withdrawal from public life). 
98 See NATURE IN FRAGMENTS: THE LEGACY OF SPRAWL, supra note 86 (discussing 
sprawl’s negative impact in terms of biodiversity, pollution, and overexploitation of 
resources); Elizabeth Farnsworth, Scientific Solutions for Sprawl, 88 ECOLOGY 531 (2007) 
(reviewing NATURE IN FRAGMENTS: THE LEGACY OF SPRAWL, supra note 86, and stating 
the need to bring scientific knowledge about sprawl’s impact on the environment to local 
planning discussions on development).  For a description of ecosystem services, see 
NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. 
Daily ed., 1997); see also sources cited supra note 14. 
99 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 94. 
100 See ELIZABETH KOPITS ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, RFF DP 09-15, LOT 
SIZE, ZONING, AND HOUSEHOLD PREFERENCES: IMPEDIMENTS TO SMART GROWTH? 
(2009), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-09-15.pdf. 
101 “SLAPP” refers to “strategic lawsuits against public participation”—actions brought 
by developers against opponents of their projects in order to silence criticism.  These suits 
may claim, for example, that parties who oppose developers’ requests are interfering with 
a developer’s business advantage or are conspiring with government actors to deprive 
developers of property rights without due process of law.  These suits succeed when 
defendants are intimidated or unable to fight to establish their rights to speak out against 
projects they oppose.  Litigants who do actively defend SLAPP suits have had success 
establishing a first amendment right to petition public officials.  See, e.g., Westfield 
Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523 (N.D. Ill. 1990).  Massachusetts has enacted a 
statute to protect against SLAPP suits.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2010).  See 
generally JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 
941–43 (4th ed. 2006). 
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nation, grumbling commuters inch along, locked in traffic gridlock, 
yet no local or regional planning agency can solve its cause—
suburban sprawl.”102  Ruhl and Salzman contend that sprawl is an 
example of a “massive problem”—a problem so big and unwieldy 
that it “has defied all variety of policy prescriptions.”103  Ruhl and 
Salzman’s project concerns strategies for government agencies to 
“whittle away” at massive problems.104  They observe that, in the 
case of sprawl, the mechanisms of the problem contain “components 
operating at different spatial and temporal scales, with causal 
feedback loops across and between scales.  It is unlikely that any 
single level of government is better positioned than any other to 
address that kind of problem.”105  Scholars like Ruhl and Salzman are 
seeking to develop new and better methods for regulators to control 
sprawl. 
Debate continues over the advantages and disadvantages of 
sprawling development and “smart growth” and over which groups or 
governing bodies should make policy decisions about growth 
patterns.106  While this debate unfolds, the inquiry in this Article 
concerns whether and how developers and financers drive land-use 
outcomes ex ante by the sheer force of economic interests that can 
arise from current financing practices.  The discussion here considers 
whether developers do, or should, have sufficient “skin in the game” 
with respect to projects to develop open space. 
B.  Securitization and Structured Finance in Real Estate Development 
Mezzanine loans are a common form of real estate development 
finance.107  They enable real estate developers108 to issue high-
 
102 J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems 
in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 60 (2010). 
103 Id. at 64. 
104 Id. at 65. 
105 Id. at 65–66. 
106 See BRUEGMANN, supra note 2; Marcilynn A. Burke, The Emperor’s New Clothes: 
Exposing the Failures of Regulating Land Use Through the Ballot Box, 84 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1453, 1476–86 (2009) (discussing the recent trend toward regulating land use with 
ballot initiatives and arguing that ballot box zoning results in deliberative failure and land 
use planning failure); William W. Buzbee, Sprawl’s Dynamics: A Comparative 
Institutional Analysis Critique, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 519 (2000) (analyzing the 
issue of ‘deciding who decides’ in the context of policy questions surrounding sprawl). 
107 For a general discussion of mezzanine lending, see Joseph Philip Forte, Mezzanine 
Finance: A Legal Background, in COMMERCIAL SECURITIZATION FOR REAL ESTATE 
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priority debt to fund the development of housing.  Developers may 
also use another transactional structure, such as a preferred equity 
investment or a junior mortgage.  A large, publicly traded developer 
may undertake projects on its own.  For reasons discussed below, 
mezzanine lending and preferred equity investments have become far 
more common than junior mortgages.109 
Developers typically acquire realty with a mortgage loan; the 
mortgagee has a first-priority lien on the land and will lend only up to 
some percentage of its appraised value.  Once a development 
company has acquired real estate, it then seeks capital to undertake 
construction on the land. 
The company may fund the development with contributions from 
the individuals or entities that are participating in the project—
typically, members in an LLC that constitutes the development 
company for a given project.  But in many instances these participants 
do not raise funds beyond what is necessary to form the LLC and 
acquire (again, usually with a mortgage loan) the undeveloped land.  
So in order to fund construction, they may assign a security interest in 
their equity in the project entity to obtain a loan from an outside 
financer—frequently, a mezzanine lender.110  By doing this, they 
 
LAWYERS 437 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials Ser. No. SJ090, 2004); Steven G. 
Horowitz & Lise Morrow, Mezzanine Financing, in REAL ESTATE FINANCING 
DOCUMENTATION: STRATEGIES FOR CHANGING TIMES 541 (ALI-ABA Course of Study 
Materials Ser. No. SJ005, 2004). 
108 The term “developer” can mean equity participants in a real estate development 
project or it can mean the person or entity that contracts with builders, lawyers, and others 
to undertake the project.  Here, “developers” refers to the persons who identify and 
undertake real estate development projects in pursuit of the profits derived from sale or 
lease of the improved property. 
109 See generally Andrew R. Berman, “Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage”—The 
Use (and Misuse of) Mezzanine Loans and Preferred Equity Investments, 11 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 76 (2005) (discussing the effects of securitization on real estate financing 
practices).  The purpose here is to examine the relationship between one very common 
form of secured transaction and the environmental consequences of the activities it funds.  
We could make similar inquiries of other transactional structures as well.  For other 
variations of transactions for real estate development, see John C. Murray, Clogging 
Revisited, 33 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 279 (1998). 
110 Mezzanine loan deals typically involve an inter-creditor agreement between the 
mortgage lender and the mezzanine lender under which the mortgage lender agrees, among 
other things, to permit the mezzanine lender to cure any defaults on the mortgage loan.  
For a discussion of these inter-creditor agreements, see Ellen M. Goodwin, Mezzanine 
Finance: Senior Lender Form of Intercreditor Agreement, in COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE 
FINANCE 2002: WHAT BORROWERS AND LENDERS NEED TO KNOW NOW 997 (PLI Real 
Estate Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. N-478, 2002). 
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transfer much of the risk to outside investors if the project fails, while 
still retaining the right to profit if it succeeds. 
Scholars report that participant equity is typically five to ten 
percent, with the combination of mortgage and mezzanine lending 
providing approximately ninety percent of a typical real estate 
development project’s capital structure cost.111  In theory, a developer 
could raise funds with a mezzanine loan and not necessarily leverage 
a project to ninety percent of its capital costs.  But in practice, 
mezzanine loans are used to generate high degrees of leverage; they 
are priced and structured to fill the gap between what mortgage 
lenders will fund and the project’s capital requirements.112 
Mezzanine loans are governed by UCC Article 9, and the collateral 
assigned to the lender is typically one hundred percent of the 
membership interests in an LLC that owns land for development.  The 
mezzanine borrower (the obligor on the loan) is an LLC.  This LLC 
has a wholly owned subsidiary—another LLC—that owns the 
underlying realty.  The borrower assigns a security interest to the 
mezzanine lender in the membership interests of the subsidiary LLC 
that holds the land.113  The real estate developers themselves—the 
participants in the project—are the members—the equity holders—of 
the mezzanine borrower. 
 
 
  
 
111 See Murray, supra note 109, at 302. 
112 See Berman, supra note 109; Murray, supra note 109. 
113 While in everyday speech we may use “debtor” interchangeably with “borrower,” 
under Article 9 a debtor is a party that assigns a security interest in property, regardless of 
whether the debtor is also an obligor (a party obligated to repay the loan).  See U.C.C. § 9-
102(a)(28), (59) (2005) (defining “debtor” and “obligor,” respectively). 
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One key feature of these transactions is an inter-creditor agreement 
between the mezzanine lender and the senior mortgage lender.  This 
agreement establishes several rights of the mezzanine lender that 
make the transaction attractive.114  Though these rights can vary from 
 
114 See Goodwin, supra note 110. 
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deal to deal, they often include the right to receive any notices of 
default on the senior mortgage, along with rights to cure any defaults 
and the right to receive the proceeds of any sales of new homes in the 
development in advance of participants in the project, such as the 
senior mortgage lender or owner.  Senior mortgage lenders agree to 
these provisions because the mezzanine lender provides capital for 
improvement of the property that increases its value, which increases 
the value of the mortgage lender’s collateral and thereby improves the 
mortgage lender’s position. 
The mezzanine lender is willing to do this because it typically 
charges a higher interest rate and has rights to foreclose on its 
collateral to become the owner of the entity that holds title to the land 
and that is obligated on the mortgage.115  This, in combination with 
its rights under the inter-creditor agreement and its right to proceeds 
of sales, makes mezzanine lending attractive. 
From the developers’ perspective, these deals are attractive because 
they provide capital beyond what a mortgage lender will provide for 
improvement of land.  By creating an LLC that holds title to the land, 
the developer creates a new class of collateral that can be assigned to 
raise capital with debt.  The value of the LLC membership interests is 
not necessarily limited to the value of the realty itself in its 
unimproved state.  Rather, the value of this entity includes its 
potential—its development permits and other rights, its investment in 
architectural planning, and its contract rights.  Mezzanine lending is a 
way for developers to capture and leverage all of the value of a 
project that exists in addition to the appraised value of the 
unimproved real estate. 
A mezzanine loan is typically nonrecourse, meaning that the lender 
has recourse only to its collateral—membership interests in an LLC—
and not to other assets of the debtor or assets of the debtor’s owners.  
(The debtor is typically a special-purpose company that has no assets 
other than the membership interests in the project company.)  
However, mezzanine lenders often include some carve-outs to the 
 
115 This is not to say that mezzanine lenders have an easy time recovering the value of 
their claims in the event of default.  The structure of mezzanine lending—especially the 
inter-creditor agreement—is designed to facilitate avoidance of default or bankruptcy, not 
to position the mezzanine lender for recovery of valuable assets upon default.  See 
Berman, supra note 21 (discussing the challenges that mezzanine lenders face when they 
attempt to recover value from their debtors through foreclosure, given that their collateral 
is the equity of an entity rather than the underlying realty). 
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nonrecourse provisions, namely for negligence or other misbehavior 
on the part of the project’s owners.  These carve-outs prevent 
developers from transferring risk created by their own bad actions. 
If the new homes are never completed, do not sell, or do not sell at 
a profit, then the project company, and the equity interests of its 
owner, are valued accordingly.  The members lose what they put in to 
acquire the interests: a relatively small amount if the project company 
acquired land with a mortgage loan and undertook construction with 
proceeds of mezzanine financing.  If the project is completed and the 
homes sell at projected prices, the members of its owner get the 
difference between the mortgage and mezzanine loan amounts (with 
interest) and the total proceeds of home sales. 
There are, of course, many different types of developers and 
development ventures, some of which are more vulnerable to the 
failure of any given project than others.  A small developer may use 
mezzanine lending to undertake a project but nevertheless be very 
vulnerable to reputational risk or personal financial risk, even though 
initial outlays of capital are relatively small.  The type of risk shifting 
that this work contemplates is in contexts where a development 
company with a portfolio of projects minimizes its exposure to risk in 
a way that facilitates undertaking a high volume of development. 
For purposes of UCC Article 9, LLC membership interests are, in 
most cases, general intangibles.116  Membership interests can be 
investment property in cases where the members so designate in their 
operating agreement.117  In some cases, mezzanine lenders require 
that the equity of the LLC in which they take an interest be designated 
as securities in accordance with UCC Article 8 (governing investment 
property).  The lenders then perfect their interests by taking control of 
the interests.118  They may also file a UCC-1 financing statement to 
give additional notice of their interests. 
From an Article 9 perspective, the rules for creation, attachment, 
and perfection of the security interest in mezzanine financing are 
straightforward.  For one thing, these transactions involve only one 
 
116 This is a catch-all category of personal property that does not fit any of the other 
collateral definitions. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42). 
117 See id. § 8-103(c). 
118 Membership interests in LLCs that are investment property may be certificated or 
uncertificated securities.  Id. 
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type of personal property collateral.119  Mezzanine lenders will 
undertake a title review and other diligence as if they were making 
mortgage loans because the equity interests that are their collateral are 
in project entities that exist only to hold title to (and limit liability 
surrounding) real estate.120  Because the collateral is LLC 
membership interests and not realty, the lender need only follow the 
Article 9 rules for creation and perfection of its interest.  Namely, the 
parties meet the criteria in UCC section 9-203 for creation and 
attachment of a valid security interest,121 and the lender perfects its 
interest by filing a UCC-1 financing statement in the jurisdiction in 
which the debtor is located122 or, in cases in which the LLC members 
opt into UCC Article 8, by establishing control of the collateral.123 
In the early years of mezzanine financing, mezzanine lenders might 
have been individuals or other real estate development companies that 
wanted to participate in a project, but did not want, for whatever 
reason, to have an equity position.124  This approach to mezzanine 
finance, however, has been dwarfed since the 1990s by institutional 
lenders creating mezzanine loan portfolios that they themselves sell or 
assign to raise capital.  Many real estate development companies are 
not required to report the capital structures of their projects.  
Numerous sources refer to a surge in popularity of mezzanine finance 
since the 1990s and to the fact that developers often use this type of 
 
119 Cf. Berman, supra note 21, at 1030 (describing mezzanine lending as complex in the 
sense that these loans can raise complex questions, and that issues surrounding lenders’ 
options for realizing value out of mezzanine loan collateral in foreclosure can be 
complex). 
120 In fact, Berman has argued that mezzanine loans (and preferred equity financing for 
real estate development) should be treated as mortgage substitutes.  See Berman, supra 
note 109. 
121 See U.C.C. § 9-203 (specifying that to create a valid interest, the creditor must give 
value, the debtor must have rights in the collateral, and the parties must enter into an 
agreement—which may be evidenced in a range of ways—under which the debtor assigns 
a security interest). 
122 See id. §§ 9-310(a), -301, -307. 
123 Id. §§ 8-106, 9-313, 9-314.  The method of establishing control of membership 
interests that are investment property varies depending on whether the interests are 
certificated or uncertificated.  See id. § 8-106. 
124 Note that the position of a mezzanine lender is very similar to an equity position 
because the borrower has no other creditors and the collateral is one hundred percent of 
equity interests in a special-purpose company.  See Georgette Chapman Poindexter, 
Dequity: The Blurring of Debt and Equity in Securitized Real Estate Financing, 2 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 233, 240 (2005). 
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loan.125  A Moody’s Investors Service report states that in 2006, 
issuances of mezzanine debt in CDOs were valued at “approximately 
$3.22 billion.”126  While this number does not indicate what portion 
of developments was funded with mezzanine lending, it does give a 
sense of the size of the securitized mezzanine loan market in 2006. 
The rise of mezzanine finance has been a function of the rise of 
securitization itself.  The relationship between mezzanine lending and 
securitization has two facets.  First, mezzanine lenders often 
securitize mezzanine loans themselves, raising money through capital 
markets to fund mezzanine loans.  Second, securitization facilities for 
mortgage loans frequently prohibit mortgage debtors from incurring 
other significant debt.  The structure of mezzanine lending enables 
new debt that does not run afoul of this prohibition.  Scholars, such as 
Georgette Chapman Phillips, have observed, “The mezzanine lending 
market grew in the United States in response to the limitation on debt 
financing in many securitized transactions.”127 
When a developer raises funds with a mezzanine loan, it in effect 
shifts risk of a project’s failure to the mezzanine lender.  The 
mezzanine lender is often a large institutional financer that in turn 
shifts the risk associated with the projects it funds to investors 
through securitization.  Because the structure of securitized 
mezzanine finance enables shifting of risk from the developer to the 
lender and from the lender to capital markets, mezzanine finance can 
create incentives to develop more land in a more speculative manner 
than the developer otherwise could or would.128  Again, there is 
 
125 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 21, at 996; Paul Rubin, Strategic Thinking for the 
Mezzanine Lender, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2009, at 42 (referring to the “popular use” 
of these loans since the 1990s). 
126 DANIEL B. RUBOCK, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERV., US CMBS AND CRE CDO: 
MOODY’S APPROACH TO RATING COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE MEZZANINE LOANS 2 
(2007), available at http://dirt.umkc.edu/attachments/MDYMezz%20Loans.pdf. 
127 Georgette Chapman Phillips, The Paradox of Commercial Real Estate Debt, 42 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 335, 358 (2009). 
128 Andrew Berman, in the course of arguing that mezzanine loans should be treated by 
courts as mortgage substitutes, notes that these loans can induce unnecessary risks as 
lenders miscalculate courts’ willingness to treat them as loans secured by equity, and not 
as subordinated debt secured by real estate.  “By failing to take into account certain 
inherent risks associated with secured subordinated financing, mezzanine lenders and 
preferred equity investors invariably engage in riskier lending practices either by over-
extending credit or under-pricing loans.  These practices all lead to unnecessary risk taking 
by all of the market participants.”  Berman, supra note 109, at 122 (discussing the risk 
associated with characterization of mezzanine loans after default).  Note that other scholars 
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nothing inherently wrong with risk transfer; risk transfer is at the 
heart of many common financial transactions.  It enables borrowers to 
undertake projects that would not otherwise have funding, yielding 
important new development and growth.  In certain contexts, 
however, risk transfer creates moral hazard and aggravates 
externalities surrounding commercial transactions.129  The project, 
here, is to consider the extent to which development of open-space 
land is a context in which risk transfer by real estate financers can 
aggravate controversial environmental results. 
Given the environmental impacts associated with certain modes of 
real estate development, perhaps we ought to consider the possibility 
of instituting special rules pertaining to these transactions in some 
contexts.  If we link a given secured transaction to the environmental 
consequences of the activities it funds, we may, for example, consider 
possibilities for a regulatory subject—a “mezzanine finance limited 
liability company”—that commercial law rules could define in order 
to reshape the capacities of certain types of private actors.130 
 
do not agree with the notion that mezzanine loans should be treated like subordinated debt 
secured by realty.  See Phillips, supra note 127. 
129 See supra note 9. 
130 It is beyond the scope of this Article to make a policy proposal.  Conceptually, 
though, one idea to explore might be an “Open Space Development LLC Act.”  State 
legislatures could enact new statutory rules either within or apart from UCC Article 9 that 
govern assignment of interests in LLCs that hold open space for development.  
Environmentalists have made arguments, in the real property context, about areas of land 
being differently situated such that not all land should be alienable in the same way.  See 
ERIC FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE (2003).  These arguments could inform a 
rethinking of the various classes of personal property and the commercial law rules that 
govern their assignment as security.  We could imagine, for example, an equity carve-out 
to assignments of interests in “mezzanine finance LLCs” holding the equity of an entity 
that holds undeveloped land that is zoned for residential housing on lots of a certain size.  
This type of act would need to define “mezzanine finance LLC” and then determine some 
percentage beyond which interests in this type of LLC may not be assigned to secure a 
loan. 
 This type of equity carve-out would not stop any particular kind of development.  It 
would merely make a certain source of capital unavailable beyond a defined threshold in 
certain contexts.  Any development could proceed, but in contexts involving a “mezzanine 
finance LLC,” only a certain percentage of the membership interests of the project entity 
holding land would be assignable as security.  The idea would be to ensure that developers 
have “skin in the game” when they undertake certain kinds of projects by prohibiting 
assignment of one hundred percent of the membership interests in LLCs in certain 
contexts.  This could minimize developers’ capacity to transfer market risk and externalize 
environmental risk in situations in which developers may be building at an accelerated 
pace to meet demands that are not sustainable, either environmentally or in terms of 
continuing housing market expansion. 
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We are all aware of the 2007 crash of the real estate market, the 
collapse in value of many mortgage-backed securities, and the 
resulting effects on financial institutions.  This crisis—and the public 
response to it—has not prompted fundamental refiguring of the 
practices of securitization or mezzanine lending.  Public discourse has 
focused overwhelmingly on ensuring that these types of transactions 
are well executed and involve sufficient due diligence.131  The 
discussion seems to focus primarily on recovery of the market. 
A recovered or healthy market will undoubtedly involve 
securitized mezzanine lending.  These transactions will continue—
only the pace may be different, but even this remains to be seen.  In 
fact, ABA-CLE advertises materials (first available in May 2010) 
 
 If a developer could not raise funds to build on open space by assigning all of the equity 
of the project LLC to an institutional mezzanine lender, then the developer would have to 
more carefully assess the project to ensure that it would be value-adding, at least from the 
perspectives of the builder and the potential buyers. 
 Financers could innovate, of course, to generate a new form of transaction that replaces 
mezzanine finance.  If they do, then lawmakers could examine whether new financing 
practices affect land use results in a way that warrants review. 
 Of course, statutory limits on certain types of security interests are just one possible idea 
to consider.  A different approach might look to commercial actors themselves, rather than 
legislation.  Institutional lenders could include provisions in mezzanine financing contracts 
that create threatening levels of recourse if developers disregard environmental objectives. 
 For example, lenders could require an environmental impact assessment of a 
prospective development that includes a report on the development’s projected carbon 
footprint.  The lender could then include, in its financing documents, covenants that 
require the developers to build in a way that meets certain objectives to reduce the 
development’s carbon footprint.  These requirements could be as stringent as requiring the 
use of certain materials and energy sources, or as minimal as requiring that the 
development contain foot and bicycle paths that provide access to a bus stop.  Costs of 
enforcing these covenants, and any damages for breach, could be sought from the 
members of the mezzanine borrower—the developers themselves—and not just from the 
proceeds or value derived from the equity of the development LLC. 
 The lender could require the developer to draft underlying homeowner association 
covenants to include things like fees that support energy-efficient transportation from the 
neighborhood to shopping or other common destinations.  Once the homes were sold, of 
course, maintenance of this obligation would no longer be within the lender’s or 
developer’s control.  It would be up to the new association to continue these activities.  
These contract-based approaches would suffer the same limitations as the Equator 
Principles and Carbon Principles discussed above.  Nothing obligates a lender to call an 
event of default or to seek remedies in response to any given contractual default. 
131 For example, there has been much outcry about mortgage loans made to borrowers 
in contexts in which the originators did nothing to verify borrowers’ ability to pay, selling 
the loans into securitization facilities such that risk of borrower nonpayment was not their 
concern.  At the same time, banks invested in mortgage-backed securities without 
demanding substantiation of the quality of the underlying loans. 
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covering the issue that “[p]ermanent lenders are financing now at 
lower loan to value ratios than previously and mezzanine financing is 
a key tool to bridging the equity gap.”132  In other words, as mortgage 
lenders return to requiring that borrowers have some equity in 
property, mezzanine lending becomes an important way to continue 
development practices that depend on higher degrees of leverage. 
C.  Is Sprawl a Function of Commercial Finance Law, or Is It Not? 
Suburban sprawl is intensely controversial.  Many scholars 
associate it with grave environmental challenges, as well as with 
social and cultural challenges.  New residential subdivisions get built 
with the proceeds of certain, identifiable forms of debt finance 
transaction.  This Section seeks to define the relationship between 
these two realities. 
1.  How Can We Say that Mezzanine Finance Itself Escalates Certain 
Types of Development?  And Why Focus on Securitized Mezzanine 
Finance as Opposed to Monetary Policy or Factors Altogether Apart 
from Finance? 
No single form of transaction determines what developers will 
build.  Monetary policy, some might say, is the driving factor in 
housing development and markets: when interest rates are low and 
buyer demand is high, there will be new housing developments.  But 
at the same time, the pace of development bears at least some 
relationship to the degree of leverage and risk transfer that structured 
finance enables. 
The inquiries at issue here might be relevant to other transaction 
structures that facilitate transfer of risk and leverage, such as 
securitization generally.  This discussion targets securitized 
mezzanine lending in particular because it is a commercial finance 
practice in which the parties are sufficiently proximate to the 
underlying development to control and anticipate its environmental 
effects, and yet at the same time, the parties are raising funds through 
capital markets. 
 
132 See ABA Web Store, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://apps.americanbar.org/abastore/index 
.cfm?section=main&fm=Product.AddToCart&pid=5430528CD (last visited Nov. 18, 
2011) (advertising ABA-CLE, Mezzanine Financing: Bridging the Gap in Loan 
Refinancings CD-ROM, May 2010). 
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The mezzanine loan is a commonly used form of financial 
transaction that permits developers to leverage projects beyond what 
other financing structures allow.133  While securitization expands 
access to capital for financing development, mezzanine lending 
provides the structure for the degree of leverage that certain modes of 
development require.134 
The use of the LLC to hold title to realty and act as mezzanine 
borrower creates a class of collateral that was not otherwise available 
for assignment.  We could discuss securitization, or “cheap money” 
generally, but if the purpose of this inquiry is to consider the 
connection between secured transactions and environmental 
consequences, then the mezzanine loan is particularly relevant.  The 
point here is not to say that certain developments happen “because of” 
mezzanine loans rather than, say, consumer preferences or cheap 
gasoline, among other things.  To say that mezzanine finance 
facilitates certain modes of development is not to isolate it as the only 
factor doing this. 
For purposes of thinking through the relationship between 
commercial finance rules and environmental results, the securitized 
mezzanine loan stands out as a transaction operating at the core of a 
controversial environmental phenomenon: suburban sprawl.  While 
other transactional forms for leveraging real estate development 
projects certainly exist, commercial transactions tend toward path 
dependency.  Once highly evolved form documentation for a 
particular structure exists, parties tend to repeat the structure.  This 
repetition and standardization of transaction forms is part of what 
facilitates the large-scale packaging and sale of the transactions for 
securitization.135 
We might say that mezzanine financing itself escalates certain 
types of development because it expands access to capital for 
developers using standardized transactional forms in which financers 
 
133 See supra Part II.B. 
134 Again, it is a widespread, established form of finance for leveraging real estate 
development projects beyond what is possible with mortgage lenders.  See supra Part II.B. 
135 Numerous scholars have discussed path dependency and form documentation in 
commercial transactions.  See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization 
and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “the Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. 
REV. 713, 718 (1997); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of 
Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479 (1998); David V. Snyder, Private 
Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371 (2003). 
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take a security interest in standardized types of collateral.  An 
institutional lender will have form documentation for making loans to 
developers building certain types of new residential subdivisions.  If 
the mezzanine lender funds these loans with proceeds of 
securitization transactions, it may have standing securitization 
facilities into which new loans to developers are directed.  What this 
implies for land-use results on the ground is that investors may have 
already reviewed and approved of form documentation for loans to 
developers secured by certain types of housing development.  When 
market conditions support new home building and buying, there can 
be a kind of queue of funding for projects fitting the preapproved 
formula—a formula at odds with objectives like open-space 
preservation, for example. 
2.  Even if Mezzanine Finance Does Escalate Certain Modes of 
Development, Why Design Finance Rules in Order to Alter Effects of 
Transactions?  And by What Logic Is Environmental Impact a 
Mezzanine Lending Issue? 
A recent discussion paper published by Resources for the Future136 
reports economists’ findings in a study of lot sizes, zoning, and 
household preferences.137  The authors report, “To the extent that 
communities want to slow the rate of growth of land used in 
development, and promote smart growth policies, there will need to 
be a move toward higher density.”138  The economists’ findings 
indicate that zoning is not an effective tool for achieving higher-
density housing.139  “An important contributor to this fact,” they 
observe, “may be that people have preferences for space and larger 
lots.  This remains a difficult challenge for achieving smart growth 
outcomes.”140 
Numerous studies have documented a trend in recent decades 
toward larger home sizes, which are occupied by families of fewer 
people.141  Mortgage securitization and the introduction of new 
 
136 Resources for the Future is a nonpartisan, nonprofit environmental research group.  
RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, http://www.rff.org/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 9, 
2011). 
137  KOPITS ET AL., supra note 100. 
138 Id. at 21. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 See, e.g., HAYDEN, supra note 2; KOPITS ET AL., supra note 100. 
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residential home mortgage products in recent years expanded 
accessibility to larger houses for many buyers.142  At the same time, 
mezzanine financing and the securitization of mezzanine loan 
portfolios have contributed to real estate developers’ capacity to build 
new homes in tandem with increased demand. 
People want new homes and, apparently, low-density housing.143  
The prevailing view is that while shoddy due diligence on the part of 
financers is bad, there is nothing bad about growth itself or 
speculation per se, or the underlying transactional structures with 
which we finance them.  Mezzanine finance simply maximizes access 
to capital for developers, which can lead to more housing that is 
available at lower costs to buyers (where developers pass savings in 
costs of capital through to buyers). 
While mezzanine finance greases144 practices that many say 
aggravate environmental problems, this mode of finance could just as 
readily fund “smart growth” or the construction of environmentally 
progressive communities.145  As John Steinbeck asks in The Grapes 
 
142 See ZYWICKI, supra note 12 (discussing the proliferation of high-income, subprime 
borrowers, and their impact on the foreclosure crisis). 
143 The idea that mezzanine finance merely accomplishes fulfillment of consumer 
preferences sidesteps important questions about these preferences.  Doug Kysar notes that 
the political community can be “tempted by the notion that its regulations and policy 
pronouncements can simply trace individual preferences, without also endogenously 
affecting them.”  DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 17 (2010).  We cannot conclude that current 
patterns of development are good because they reflect consumer preferences; these 
preferences themselves will change with the landscape they transform using currently 
available tools and policies.  The disappearance of open space itself will change our 
culture, expectations, and preferences.  Recent scholarship discusses how the 
environmental movement must transform in the face of disappearance of places untouched 
by humans.  See PAUL WAPNER, LIVING THROUGH THE END OF NATURE: THE FUTURE OF 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM 210 (2010) (arguing that, given impending 
disappearance of nature or wilderness, neither the dream of naturalism nor the dream of 
mastery over nature can survive, leaving a breached boundary between humans and nature 
that requires a new coevolutionary path). 
144 The use of chemicals as metaphor—grease, fuel, friction eliminators—is deliberate, 
as environmental law has an established history of approving chemicals for use in some 
contexts but not others.  Chemicals that are useful and important for some places and 
processes are lethal in others. 
145 A range of such communities has cropped up in recent years.  See, e.g., Jason 
Blevins, “Agriburbia” Sprouts on Colorado's Front Range, DENV. POST, Oct. 24, 2009, 
http://www.denverpost.com/ci_13631048 (describing the practice of allocating some lots 
in a subdivision for growing vegetables and other plants).  Though interesting, these 
examples are relatively small-scale anomalies to standard development patterns. 
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of Wrath (and Barnes excerpts in his critique of UCC Article 9): “Is a 
tractor bad?  Is the power that turns the long furrows wrong?”146 
Obviously there are many factors other than commercial finance 
that shape and fuel the phenomenon of suburbanization and its 
complex implications: tax subsidies for home mortgages, zoning and 
local government objectives, and highway infrastructure, to name a 
few.  Mezzanine lending may appear, compared to these factors, like 
a behind-the-scenes detail.  Any real collective action to address 
issues that suburbanization presents should take place in the public 
fora for addressing zoning and regulation.  Mezzanine lenders and 
borrowers are just squirrels getting their nuts from a pattern of 
development that results from larger forces.  If certain kinds of 
development are in fact undesirable, they should be taxed. 
Yet, as difficult, collective issues surrounding sprawling 
development simmer in public discourse, mezzanine lending makes it 
possible for real estate developers to maximize the pace of building.  
It is not clear what the best approach to land use is.  Communities 
deliberate over complex, multifaceted goals, such as desire to have 
open space and desire to have new neighborhoods to support the tax 
base and to attract new residents.  These deliberations may not be 
resolvable using cost-benefit concepts.  They invoke deep challenges 
surrounding the coexistence of a love of nature and a tolerance of 
loss.147 
Even dramatically increased consumer commitment to 
conservation may not curtail environmentally problematic growth 
patterns because even the most evolved environmentalist ethic 
encounters the paradox that people at the same time love the natural 
 
146 JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 151 (Penguin Books 1999) (1939); 
Barnes, supra note 20, at 458.  There is an instrumentalist aesthetic at play in commercial 
law—an aesthetic in which law has the properties of a physical object.  The notion that law 
is a tool implies that law has a utility detached from cultural or ideological commitments.  
See Hughes, supra note 20, at 723–29.  This thinking builds on Annalise Riles’s 
observation that “[t]he principal insight of Realism was that law was best imagined 
metaphorically as a tool,” but at some point in the twentieth century “the idea that law was 
like a tool quite literally became a tool of its own.”  Riles, supra note 53, at 980–81 
(discussing aesthetic dimensions of technocratic approaches to law).  In the commercial 
law context, the idea that commercial law is a tool has become a tool of its own.  The 
metaphor of commercial law as a tool is itself a tool useful for emphasizing commercial 
law’s neutrality with respect to the effects of the transactions it governs. 
147 See NICHOLSEN, supra note 3. 
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environment and feel indifferent toward its destruction.148  A choice 
by a consumer to buy a house with a large carbon footprint in a 
previously undeveloped area despite knowledge of and concern for 
environmental impact is not a simple expression of preference that 
public policy should ratify.149 
We could say that environmental consequences of suburban sprawl 
are a commercial finance problem because securitized mezzanine 
lending enables real estate development to outpace the process by 
which communities should make decisions about growth.  
Commercial finance laws create an appetizing buffet of opportunities 
to profit from developing land into new residential subdivisions.  
While communities, institutions, and individuals struggle with the 
value and meaning of open space, transactional structures designed to 
maximize access to capital for certain types of development enable a 
fast pace of land consumption. 
New low-density housing has been (and will be) in demand.  The 
benefits and costs associated with it are complex to assess; the 
normative values that give structure to cost-benefit analyses of real 
estate development require ongoing, collective determination.150  
Suburbanization of open space raises controversies that 
 
148 Environmentalists and psychoanalysts have explored this paradox and its effects on 
behavior concerning the environment.  See, e.g., NICHOLSEN, supra note 3; HAROLD F. 
SEARLES, Unconscious Processes in Relation to the Environmental Crisis, in 
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE AND RELATED SUBJECTS 228, 229 (1979) (contending that we 
are hampered in meeting the environmental crisis by a severe and pervasive apathy which 
is based largely upon feelings of which we are unconscious); GARY SNYDER, THE 
PRACTICE OF THE WILD (1990) (exploring the depth and complexity of our relationship to 
the wild). 
149 A 2005 study assessing public discourse about sprawl found high levels of concern 
about environmental impact and increases in traffic; yet, sprawling development has not 
abated.  See David N. Bengston et al., An Analysis of Public Discourse on Urban Sprawl 
in the United States: Monitoring Concern About Major Threats to Forests, 7 FOREST 
POL’Y & ECON. 745, 745–56 (2005) (assessing computer content analysis of media and 
public reports on sprawl and finding increasing levels of concern for loss of open space 
and other environmental impacts of sprawl).  Some scholars attribute this to the “power of 
the American dream.”  See, e.g., Mark S. Davies, Understanding Sprawl: Lessons from 
Architecture for Legal Scholars, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1520, 1525 (2001) (reviewing ANDRÉS 
DUANY ET AL., supra note 7).  Other scholars have explored the ways in which consumer 
preferences and choices relate to identity formation and expression.  See LIZABETH 
COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR 
AMERICA (2003). 
150 Cf. Kysar, supra note 20 (discussing how cost-benefit analyses animate underlying 
values and arguing for ecological economics or cost-benefit analyses that incorporate 
limits on the natural environment’s capacity to sustain growth). 
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environmental regulation struggles to address, such as, for example, 
loss of large predator habitat.151  Low-density development is not 
necessarily containable through zoning.152  Disagreement, conflict, 
hopes, and aspirations surround this type of development.153 
As long as it is a good bet that homes of a certain size will sell at a 
certain price point in a given location, mezzanine lending expands 
access to capital for developers to place the bet.  Not all of these bets 
need to be successful.  In this way, securitized mezzanine finance can 
enable developers to engage in “premature or unnecessary conversion 
of open-space land for urban uses.”154  They can begin clearing off 
habitats, grading roads over fields, and the like, in anticipation of 
success.  But if it looks like the bet is not a good one, developers can 
cease construction or leave houses sitting partially built.155  If the 
relevant project company defaults on loans, then the mortgagee 
recovers the value of the land.  Dealing with whatever value is left in 
the project is the mezzanine lender’s problem.156  The mezzanine 
lender, in turn, has often transferred this risk to others by securitizing 
its mezzanine loan portfolio. 
One might say that if mezzanine finance were no longer available 
at the lowest possible cost, then developers would simply use junior 
mortgages to leverage their projects.  This may be true, but junior 
 
151 Large predators such as bears and wolves require long corridors over which to 
travel.  They cover too much ground to coexist with people in a landscape divided up by 
development.  The protection of specific areas in the forms of public parks and preserves 
is not adequate to accommodate these animals.  See REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., THE 
COSTS OF SPRAWL: ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS OF ALTERNATIVE 
RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS AT THE URBAN FRINGE 142 (1974); Robert W. 
Burchell, Economic and Fiscal Costs (and Benefits) of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 159, 168–69 
(1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1997). 
152 See KOPITS ET AL., supra note 100; see also sources cited supra note 95. 
153 Cf. MIT Press, Back cover to ELIZABETH FARRELLY, BLUBBERLAND: THE 
DANGERS OF HAPPINESS (2008) (assessing consumption, its eco-footprint, and a state of 
mind in which we expect to be happy, but in fact grow less happy and yet do not abandon 
habits we know to be both psychologically and ecologically destructive).  “[Q]uadruple-
garaged mansions, vast malls, [and] gated communities” are among the consumer-driven 
developments that Farrelly discusses.  Id. 
154 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65561 (West 2010). 
155 Securitized mezzanine loans—and the commercial laws that enable them—facilitate 
development that can create devastating environmental costs without always creating 
whatever value is associated with new housing.  For example, developers may prepare 
land for development by constructing graded roads and clearing off trees but then delay or 
abandon plans for actual home building.  See HAYDEN, supra note 7, at 18–19. 
156 See supra text accompanying note 115. 
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mortgages do not create the same degree of leverage that mezzanine 
loans do.  If junior mortgages are like spraying some WD-40 on the 
gears of building developments, mezzanine finance is like treating 
development with an advanced, friction-eliminating chemical. 
The details of securitized mezzanine finance may seem ancillary in 
relation to forces like, for example, federal subsidies for automobile 
dependency and residential mortgage financing.  Yet focusing on real 
estate finance practices could enable greater sensitivity to the pace 
and desirability of suburban developments.  So long as suburban 
sprawl remains a controversial topic, perhaps commercial finance 
rules should not maximize opportunities for leverage that can 
accelerate development beyond the pace of important collective 
decisions about land use and the built environment. 
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